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ABSTRACT 
 After more than five decades and despite several successes, the Philippines is still 
fighting a communist insurgency within its country. This study compared and analyzed 
four counterinsurgency campaign plans implemented by the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP) after the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution: Oplan Lambat Bitag 
during the Corazon Aquino and Ramos administrations, Oplan Bantay-Laya during the 
Arroyo administration, the Internal Peace and Security Plan Bayanihan during the 
Benigno Aquino III administration, and the current Development Support and Security 
Plan Kapayapaan led by the Duterte administration. This study found that inadequate 
sustainment capability, lack of support from government institutions, and challenges to 
political leadership constitute the primary factors that have hindered the AFP campaigns. 
The current government recognizes these problems and has instituted several initiatives 
to overcome them, including a Community Support Program implemented by the AFP 
that increases intra-governmental collaboration, an enhanced partnership with civil 
society, and the creation of a national task force to help consolidate the diverse efforts of 
multiple national agencies, local government units, and civil society to improve security, 
good governance, and economic conditions and opportunities. Building on these, this 
thesis recommends further improvements to strengthen support for the current campaign 
and areas for future study. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
This thesis sheds light on why communist insurgency has continued to exist in the 
Philippines. The Philippines is not new to facing insurgency. Indeed, its people have been 
fighting and participating in insurgency since the Spanish colonization of the country. One 
of the most notable Philippine counterinsurgency successes occurred during the time of 
President Ramon Magsaysay when his administration defeated the Hukbalahap insurgents 
in 1955.1 Nevertheless, communist insurgents reemerged in the late 1960s, and the 
Philippines has been fighting them ever since. Subsequent presidential administrations 
have implemented various counterinsurgency strategies to address this insurgency problem 
as well as the concurrent Moro-Muslim insurgencies. Although there have been notable 
successes, the problem of insurgencies remains.  
Many counterinsurgency experts believe that to develop an effective 
counterinsurgency strategy, governments must first identify their own strengths and 
weaknesses in facing their adversaries. This study compares and analyzes four 
counterinsurgency campaign plans implemented by the Armed Forces of the Philippines 
(AFP) after the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution: Oplan Lambat Bitag (Net Trap) 
during the Corazon Aquino and Ramos administrations, Oplan Bantay-Laya (Guarding 
Freedom) during the Arroyo administration, the Internal Peace and Security Plan 
Bayanihan (Civic Unity) during the Benigno Aquino III administration, and the current 
Development Support and Security Plan Kapayapaan (Peace) led by the Duterte 
administration. This study found that inadequate sustainment capability, lack of support 
from government institutions, and challenges to political leadership constitute the primary 
factors that have hindered the AFP campaigns. 
The results of this study help us understand the underlying reasons why the 
communist insurgency has continued to exist in the Philippines, despite the fall of the 
Soviet Union, China’s move to a hybrid economy, and the demise of nearly all other 
1 Philippine Army, Aspect of Insurgency, ST-015 (Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City: Philippine Army, 
2005), 2–2. 
2 
communist insurgencies around the world. Focusing on the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines (AFP), this thesis also develops recommendations for improving and 
developing an effective and efficient implementation of the military’s holistic 
counterinsurgency strategy. 
A. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Philippines has been fighting Communist insurgents since the 1950s. Although 
there have been several successes, the insurgency problem remains, fueled especially by 
the emergence of the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) in December 1968 and the 
formation of the New People’s Army (NPA) in March 1969.2 To come up with a sound 
and effective counterinsurgency strategy, one must understand the different dynamics of 
insurgency warfare, as well as the strengths and weaknesses of one’s own government, 
military, and society. In the case of the Philippines, communist insurgents have capitalized 
on societal gaps, such as the stark divide between rich and poor, the power of some family 
clans at the expense of many, and the perceived government inactions on the delivery of 
basic social services to the populace. Effective counterinsurgency strategies integrate 
government actions to address these gaps while also mounting sound efforts in intelligence 
gathering and defeating militants. 
There is a vast literature on insurgency, counterinsurgency, and communist 
insurgencies. These works present several arguments on the reasons why insurgency trends 
rise, decline, and then resurge over decades. Identifying the root causes of the problem, 
political leadership, and military actions are the common points of discussion in the 
different literature available.     
In his book, Counterinsurgency Warfare Theory and Practice, author David Galula 
seeks to provide a guide for counterinsurgents as useful as that which Mao Tse Tung 
provided for the revolutionary actor.3 Galula described four laws for counterinsurgency 
 
2 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, PAM 2-00011 (Fort Bonifacio, Taguig 
City: Philippine Army, 2005), 2–8. 
3 David Galula, Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (New York, NY: F.A. Praeger, 
1964), xii. 
3 
and emphasized the importance of the popular support for an effective counterinsurgency 
strategy. The first law is that public support is paramount in any counterinsurgency 
campaign. Second, support of the masses can be obtained with the help of an active friendly 
minority. Third, popular support may be lost if not properly, humanely, and effectively 
protected. Fourth, right action, such as building infrastructure and establishing long-term 
relationships with the populace, and adequate resources are needed in key areas.4  
Sir Robert Thompson, in his book Defeating Communist Insurgency: The Lessons 
of Malaya and Vietnam, discussed the basic principles of counterinsurgency and described 
how these principles were applied in Malaya and Vietnam.5 The first principle states that 
the government should have a clear political aim, not just a military aim. Second, the 
government should function within the law. Third, the government should have an overall 
plan with identified methods for carrying out that plan. Fourth, the government should 
prioritize defeating political subversion rather than the guerillas. Last, in the guerilla phase 
of a campaign, the government should secure its base area first. Thompson further argued 
the importance of seizing the initiative from the insurgents for a successful 
counterinsurgency strategy.  
In his book, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines, author 
Benedict Kerkyliet offered several explanations as to how the Huk Rebellion emerged and 
grew.6 First is that the traditional patron-client relationship between the landlords and 
peasants had broken, with the landlords not sufficiently serving the well-being of their 
clients. Second, the neglect of basic political issues such as justice, human rights, and an 
acceptable level of distribution of wealth and resources contributed to the problem. Third, 
with the exception of the Ferdinand Marcos regime in the 1960s, government leaders did 
not cause the rebellion; they only shaped it. Last, class antagonism heightened and 
prolonged the struggle.  
 
4 Galula, 55–59. 
5 Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, 1st ed. (New York: F.A. Praeger, 1966). 
6 Benedict Kerkyliet, The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines (Lanham, MD: 
Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1977). 
4 
Unlike the works just described, Counterinsurgency in Paradise: Seven Decades of 
Civil War in the Philippines, by Aaron Morris, was the first to cover the military history of 
the Philippines and explore how the Armed Forces of the Philippines has had to adapt to 
different insurgency movements in the country.7 It takes a deeper look into how the AFP 
transformed from a conventional military fighting an external threat during World War II 
to develop elite forces and other means necessary to suppress revolts and address the 
evolving internal threats to the integrity of the state. Morris argued that political solutions 
are the only viable route to defeating the major separatist and insurgent groups because of 
the AFP’s inability to break the back of insurgencies.  
Taking a similar perspective, in his books The Accidental Guerilla and 
Counterinsurgency, David Kilcullen uses three 21st-century battles to explain why 
insurgency occurs. In The Accidental Guerilla, he argued that conventional warfare has 
repeatedly failed to produce constructive results in complex, multisided conflicts such as 
the war in Iraq.8 Kilcullen recommended five ideas that the United States should consider 
to adapt to the changing paradigm of conflict. First is the need for a new lexicon that will 
describe the new threats. Second is the need to have a grand strategy that can be sustained 
by the people, administration, and key allies and partners. Third, imbalance in government 
capability, heavily skewed toward military might at the expense of socio-economic and 
political approaches, must be remedied. Fourth, new strategic services are needed that 
would help identify and prioritize interagency efforts. Fifth is the need to develop a 
capacity for strategic information warfare that integrates interagency efforts and develops 
a national-level strategic information campaign.  
In Counterinsurgency, Kilcullen asserted that every counterinsurgency operation 
should be tailored to the operational environment and the populace.9 He also argued for 
the importance of accounting for the cultural and governmental aspects that gave rise to 
 
7 Aaron Morris, Counterinsurgency in Paradise: Seven Decades of Civil War in the Philippines (West 
Midlands, England: Helion & Company Limited, 2016). 
8 David Kilcullen, The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Midst of a Big One (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2009). 
9 David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
5 
insurgency, which he believes are unique to each situation. Authors Lawrence Cline and 
Paul Schemella, in The Future of Counterinsurgency, echo several of Kilcullen’s points. 
They explain that insurgencies and other forms of internal security problems often become 
more complex and difficult to manage over time and that it is critical to understand the 
lessons from the different counterinsurgency strategies employed, both more broadly and 
in each particular case.10  
Several books from the Philippines also provide insight for this study.  
Author Victor Corpus in his book, Silent War, presented an overview of the tactics of 
communist insurgents and recommended a holistic Philippine counterinsurgency 
strategy.11 In fact, the ideas in his book influenced the reorientation of the Philippine 
counterinsurgency effort in the late 1980s and early 1990s, influencing efforts from 1989 
to 1996. Both Corpus and Morris agree on the need for the AFP to develop and evolve to 
address the insurgents in the country. Morris, however, believes that a political solution is 
more viable than a military one while Corpus argues for the need to have a holistic 
counterinsurgency strategy that integrates government and military actions. Meanwhile, 
Soliman M. Santos Jr., Paz Verdades M. Santos et al., authors of the book Primed and 
Purposeful: Armed Group and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines, emphasized the 
importance of the domestic political context, which plays a significant role in an effective 
counterinsurgency strategy.12 
Overall, the various literature available has emphasized the importance of 
integrating actions of the government, winning and maintaining popular support, and 
providing consistent and capable leadership to achieve a successful counterinsurgency 
strategy.  
 
10 Lawrence Cline and Paul Shemella, The Future of Counterinsurgency Contemporary Debates in 
Internal Security Strategy (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO LLC, 2015). 
11 Victor N. Corpus, Silent War (Quezon City, Philippines: VNC Enterprises, 1989). 
12 Soliman M. Santos et al., Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the 
Philippines (Geneva, Switzerland: Small Arms Survey, Graduate Institute of International and 
Development Studies, 2010). 
6 
B. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis uses the case study method to better understand the intransigence of the 
communist insurgency in the Philippines. It focuses on the strategies, tactics, and resources 
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines in combating the communist insurgency in the 
Philippines to assess the different factors that affect these strategies and recommend how 
the AFP can improve its strategies to defeat the communist insurgents.  
Specifically, this study compares and analyzes four campaign plans that were 
implemented by the AFP after the 1986 EDSA People Power Revolution: first, the Oplan 
Lambat Bitag (Net Trap) that was implemented by the AFP during the Corazon Aquino 
and Fidel V. Ramos administrations (1989–1996); second, Oplan Bantay-Laya (Guarding 
Freedom) during the Arroyo administration (2001–2010); third, the Internal Peace and 
Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan (Civic Unity) during the Benigno Aquino III 
administration (2010–2016); and fourth, the Development Support and Security Plan 
(DSSP) Kapayapaan (Peace) that is currently being implemented by the AFP under the 
Duterte administration. This study uses data available from the AFP, independent reports 
and assessments about the counterinsurgency operations in the Philippines from think tanks 
and nongovernmental organizations, books and theses related to the Philippine communist 
counterinsurgency, government reports from the Philippines and United States, and the 
author’s experience as a military officer in the AFP. 
In analyzing the four AFP campaign plans, this thesis explores the different factors 
that affect their implementation and effectiveness. First, it examines the socio-political 
situations at the time of the implementation of the campaign. Second, it analyzes and 
compares the different operational accomplishments in terms of enemy neutralized, 
firearms recovered, areas recovered, and underground mass organizations co-opted. Third, 
this study examines external involvement in terms of support given to the AFP in the 
implementation of the campaign. Lastly, this thesis compares and analyzes leadership 
factors in terms of the political and military leaders who were setting and implementing 
the campaigns. While this may not cover all the factors affecting the counterinsurgency 
strategy in the Philippines, better understanding these factors can help us know why the 
7 
communist insurgency continues to exist in the Philippines and develop recommendations 
as to how the AFP can improve its counterinsurgency strategy. 
C. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This study is organized into six chapters to provide readers with a clear 
understanding of the communist insurgency and the efforts of the AFP to defeat it. Chapter 
I offers a brief background of the study and the main research question it endeavors to 
answer. It also explains why this question is significant and discusses the relevant literature 
available and the research methodology used in the study. Chapter II provides the reader 
with a brief history of the communist insurgency, including its organization, strength, 
leadership, and strategies used against the Philippine government. This study then focuses 
on four campaigns implemented by the AFP. Chapter III analyzes and compares the first 
three campaign plans by looking at each campaign’s objectives and strategies, its 
operational accomplishments, and the external support that each campaign received. 
Chapter IV focuses on the various factors that hampered the implementation of the AFP’s 
campaigns. In turn, Chapter V compares the three previous campaigns to the current 
campaign, the DSSP Kapayapaan. Finally, Chapter VI brings these analyses together, 
presents conclusions, and provides recommendations for policy and further research. 
  
8 
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II. UNDERSTANDING THE 
COMMUNIST INSURGENCY THREAT 
The Philippine government has been fighting two long-running insurgencies: a 
Moro-Muslim conflict since the early 1970s and a communist struggle since the 1950s. 
The Philippine communist insurgency is the longest-running communist insurgency in 
Asia.13 Communist ideology was first introduced to the Philippines in the 1930s, drawing 
support from farmers in Central Luzon and workers and disgruntled elites in Manila.14 
Since then, two communist parties have organized in the country. First came the Partido 
Komunista ng Pilipinas (PKP), founded by Crisanto Evangelista in the 1930s, which was 
heavily influenced by Marxist-Leninist ideology; it and the associated Huks were defeated 
in the 1950s.15 The second, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), led by Jose 
Maria Sison, broke away from the PKP, looked to Maoist ideology, and formally 
reestablished a communist insurgency in the late 1960s.  
This chapter focuses on the CPP and its military arm, the New People’s Army 
(NPA), by first tracing their roots and the causes of their emergence. Political and economic 
inequality and abuses by government security forces and the elites represent the main 
reasons why the communist insurgency re-emerged in the country.16 Second, this chapter 
describes the CPP-NPA’s objectives, which were to replace the Philippines’ political and 
socio-economic systems with those based on communist principles and structures, along 
with their protracted people’s-war strategy. Lastly, the chapter discusses the CPP-NPA’s 
organization, structure, and leadership, which have been important for its continued 
existence. 
 
13 “Philippines’ Communist Rebellion Is Asia’s Longest-Running Insurgency,” South China Morning 
Post, September 16, 2019, https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3027414/explained-
philippines-communist-rebellion-asias-longest-running. 
14 Ricardo C. Morales, “Perpetual War: The Philippine Insurgencies” (Master’s thesis, Monterey, CA, 
Naval Postgraduate School, 2003), 19. 
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A. PARTIDO KOMUNISTA NG PILIPINAS AND THE HUK REBELLION
The first Philippine communist insurgency traces its roots to an affinity with
communist Russia. Crisanto Evangelista, a labor leader and former member of the 
Nacionalista Party [Nationalist Party], led the establishment of the Partido Komunista ng 
Pilipinas (PKP) [Communist Party of the Philippines] on November 7, 1930.17 As part of 
their activities, the PKP conducted labor organizing and boycotted the electoral process.18 
Since its founding, the group also organized a guerilla force against U.S. colonialism (until 
independence in 1946), Japanese colonialism (1941–1945), and the Filipino elites.19 
During the Japanese invasion, the PKP merged with the Hukbong Bayan Laban sa mga 
Hapon, or People’s Army, more popularly known as the Hukbalahap, or Huks, against the 
Japanese. After World War II, still well-equipped and organized, the PKP and the Huks 
continued to fight, this time against the Philippine government.  
The Huk Rebellion was considered the first organized rebellion against the newly 
established Philippine government and lasted from 1946 to the mid-1950s.20 To quell the 
rebellion, the government first launched a series of counterinsurgency campaigns that 
emphasized military campaigns to destroy the armed insurgents. By the 1950s, the 
government, then under President Ramon Magsaysay, implemented the strategic concept 
“all out friendship-all out force” to arrest the growing revolutionary threat.21 One of its 
key features was mass resettlement of landless tenant farmers to Mindanao. With the 
United States’ help, Magsaysay’s campaign broke the backbone of the PKP and its armed 
wing. 
B. COMMUNIST RE-EMERGENCE
In his book, The Red Revolution, author Gregg Jones described the Philippine
communist insurgency as a result of “classical third-world fusion of peasant unrest and 
17 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 2–4. 
18 Philippine Army, 2–5. 
19 Philippine Army, 2–5. 
20 Morales, “Perpetual War: The Philippine Insurgencies,” 19. 
21 Philippine Army, The Communist Party of the Philippines, 2–7. 
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nationalism.”22 Jones primarily attributed the communist insurgency’s re-emergence in the 
Philippines to the different global forces that were at work during the 1960s, including the 
war in Vietnam, the political radicalism that was sweeping college campuses in different 
parts of the world, and the cultural revolution in China. He further mentioned corruption 
in the government, abuses by state forces, and increasing poverty as among the primary 
contributors to the spread of communist insurgency in the country.  
The communist insurgency in the Philippines formally re-emerged in the late 1960s 
as the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) under the leadership of Jose Maria Sison. 
The reestablishment of the CPP took place in the second week of January 1968, when the 
party congress was convened, but the founding members decided to mark its organization 
as December 26, 1968, to coincide with the 75th anniversary of Mao Zedong’s birthday.23 
The 15 founding members were from lower- and middle-class society: seven were students, 
three were workers/laborers, and five were professionals.24 Indicative of their weak start, 
only 12 members actually showed up to formally establish the CPP.25  
Realizing the need to create a people’s army to launch an armed struggle, and 
believing armed struggle was necessary to realize the transformation of Philippine society, 
Sison met with Bernabe Buscayno, who commanded some of the remnants of the Huks 
operating in Central Luzon.26 The meeting resulted in the establishment of the NPA, the 
CPP’s armed wing, on March 29, 1969, with Bernabe Buscayno as its founding leader.27  
With only 60 combatants and 35 rifles, the CPP-NPA was first organized and based in the 
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small city of Capas on the Philippines’ largest island, Luzon.28 While engagement with 
government forces was unavoidable, the CPP-NPA avoided unnecessary engagement with 
government forces; they instead focused on conducting propaganda campaigns and 
organizing work to strengthen the support of the masses and the group’s growth.29 This 
newer manifestation of Philippine communist insurgents proudly waged an indigenous 
revolution without international aid. Although China gave a token amount of aid in the 
early stages, it was quickly cut off, because China wanted improved relations with the 
Philippines, thus leaving the communist insurgents to fend for themselves.30  
C. CPP-NPA OBJECTIVES, STRATEGIES, AND TACTICS  
Unlike its predecessor, the PKP, which used the Russian model for its revolutionary 
struggle, the CPP followed Mao Zedong’s model for armed revolution. The lessons learned 
from the failures and shortcomings of the PKP have greatly influenced the CPP-NPA, 
particularly its leader, Jose Maria Sison, and compelled him to further study Philippine 
society.31 He identified three conditions within the Philippine society that could be 
exploited to further the revolutionary situation in the country: “the contradiction between 
the Filipino nation and imperialism, contradiction between the great masses of the people 
and feudalism, and the contradiction between the people’s interest and the present 
government acting on behalf of U.S. imperialism and the feudal landlords.”32 These 
conditions reflected the CPP’s ongoing grievances. Their primary grievances are economic 
exploitation by international business interests, economic exploitation by landed elite 
families, and political exploitation by the same elite families.  
This analysis led the CPP to adopt three basic concepts in carrying out the 
revolution: first to launch a protracted people’s war, second to establish guerilla bases in 
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the countryside, and lastly to establish a united front.33 The United Front, as conceived by 
Mao Zedong, would utilize organizing and propaganda efforts to mobilize the masses 
against the government.34  
1. Objectives 
The CPP-NPA has two primary objectives: to seize political power through armed 
and legal struggle and to supplant the “country’s democratic form of government with 
communist-party rule.”35 To achieve this, the CPP-NPA has divided its strategies into two 
categories: first, a general strategy that pertains to war as a whole; and second, a specific 
strategy that focuses on counter-campaigns within a specific guerilla front or base area.36 
2. Protracted People’s War: CPP-NPA’s Three-Stage Insurgency 
Strategy  
The lessons learned from the premature shift to conventional operations by the 
Huks, led the CPP-NPA to realize the importance of the protracted nature of their 
struggle.37 When the CPP-NPA started the insurgency in 1969, the balance of forces was 
heavily against its favor and, as such, for the CPP-NPA, the most important factor to 
measure insurgency success was to view the revolution as a stage-by-stage process.38 The 
CPP has looked upon Mao Zedong’s three-stage strategy of protracted war as their path to 
victory and adopted it meticulously. In his book, Silent War, Victor Corpus discussed the 
Strategy of Protracted People’s War (PPW) being divided into three major stages: Strategic 
Defensive, Strategic Stalemate, and Strategic Offensive.39 For the CPP-NPA, the Strategic 
Defensive stage is their initial stage of the protracted war and is a critical period for “party 
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building, army building, base building, and the organization of the united front.”40 
According to Corpus, during this stage, the CPP-NPA believes that they are on the 
defensive since their strength is small while the government forces are relatively big. They 
see their forces and base areas as vulnerable against government forces, which they believe 
are on the offensive against them.  
Strategic Stalemate is the second stage of PPW as described by Corpus. This stage 
is achieved when CPP-NPA forces are able to gather and organize forces that are able to 
achieve relative parity with government forces, at least in areas they seek to hold.41 
According to Corpus, this stage does not mean that insurgent forces should be at par or 
equal with that of the government forces. Instead, the insurgents believe that only a portion 
of the government forces are actually engaged in counterinsurgency operations.42 Corpus 
further explained that for this stage to be attained, more and more government forces are 
tied down to defend towns, vital government functions, and private installations.  
According to Victor Corpus, the last stage of the protracted war is the Strategic 
Offensive. He stated that this is achieved when the balance of forces reverses.43 The CPP-
NPA forces are capable of launching offensive campaigns against government forces, 
while the government forces are forced to defend key areas and facilities such as towns, 
cities, and military installations. At this stage, Corpus further explained, the insurgents 
believe that it is just a matter of time before the regime falls. 
3. Three Main Weapons 
To attain their objectives, the CPP uses three main weapons, which is in line with 
Mao Zedong’s principles: the party, which provides the brains and leadership for the 
struggle; an army, which provides a military force to implement the party’s plans; and a 
united front, acting as a shield to defend the party against its adversaries.44 The CPP acts 
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as the party, the force that advances the communist cause.45 It should comprise a “highly 
disciplined group of professional revolutionaries dedicated to the overthrow of government 
and the existing social system.”46 The CPP provides the necessary leadership and guidance 
to direct the actions of the NPA in the countryside and the United Front in urban areas.  
The New People’s Army, known as the NPA, acts as the principal military force of 
the party and is tasked with waging and eventually winning armed struggle against 
government forces, which it primarily defines as military forces. To achieve its task, the 
NPA needs to be both an ideological force engaged in political struggle under the CPP and 
a peasant-based guerilla army.47 As an ideological force, the NPA acts as the private army 
of the CPP, providing the party with the necessary political support, such as propaganda 
and organizing work in the countryside.48  
As a guerilla army, the NPA is organized and trained to confront a larger and better-
equipped counterinsurgency force.49 It utilizes four echelons of fighting units to implement 
PPW.50 First is the Regular Mobile Force, which has the primary function of defending its 
guerilla bases and launching relatively large tactical offensives against government forces. 
Second is the Guerilla Forces, which are tasked to defend the broader guerilla zones and 
act as an advance party of the regular mobile force in targeted areas. The third echelon 
consists of the Militia and Self-defense Corps, which are mostly composed of able-bodied 
men from the local barrios or villages. Their primary function is to be the eyes and ears of 
the regular mobile force against government forces and informants. These barrio members 
also act as guides to the regular mobile force.  
Following Mao’s concept, the United Front is conceived as a social movement 
which uses the masses to unleash its energy against the government. The United Front is 
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the CPP’s organizational effort to mobilize, unite, and restructure the basic social classes 
in Philippine society against the government.51 The United Front, led by political cadres 
of the CPP, is tasked with organizing the different sectors of society, such as farmers, 
workers, women, youth, and labor, into a well-structured mass organization to create a 
multiplier effect in urban areas.  
These mass organizations are used by the CPP-NPA to achieve four objectives: 
first, the CPP-NPA creates organizations that seek to neutralize organizations and 
institutions that support the government; second, it legitimizes the insurgent causes by 
demonstrating popular support and claiming to fight for members’ interests; third, it 
facilitates information and intelligence gathering in urban areas that is then used for 
propaganda campaigns; and fourth, it generates mass support for anti-government protests 
and provides a pool of recruits for the CPP and the NPA.52  The CPP’s National United 
Front has a formal structure called the National Democratic Front (NDF). It is comparable 
to the National Liberation Front in South Vietnam, which led the insurgency during the 
Vietnam War.53  
D. CPP-NPA STRUCTURE, ORGANIZATION, AND LEADERSHIP 
Although the CPP-NPA started as a small and ill-equipped organization, it 
gradually evolved into a complex and well-organized anti-government force. The CPP-
NPA has been able to adapt to the changing situation in the country and to use this situation 
to its own advantage. The CPP-NPA has been effective in implementing its policy of 
centralized leadership and de-centralized operations. 
1. Structure and Organization 
Since its reestablishment in 1968, the CPP has implemented several major 
organizational changes in response to the changing socio-political-economic situation in 
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the country and to ensure that the revolutionary struggle continues to advance.54 The CPP-
NPA is composed of distinct organs that have different tasks to support the party. At the 
national level, the CPP-NPA has an organizational set-up that is streamlined to steer the 
party administration and operation from the national point of view.55 The first of these 
institutions is the National Congress, which acts as the supreme leadership of the party and 
is normally convened by the Central Committee every five years to discuss, review, and 
ratify the CPP’s constitution and plan of action and to decide the political approach of the 
party.56  The second is the Central Committee, which is the highest-ranking CPP 
committee in the country. Its chairman serves as the principal ideological and political 
leader of the party.57 The General Secretariat is the administrative body that takes charge 
of the management and day-to-day activities of the party at the national level. It is under 
the leadership of the Political Bureau (POLITBORO) and Executive Committee.58  
Directly under the POLITBORO, several functional commissions perform distinct 
tasks to support the party and exemplify the extensive, complex nature of the CPP-NPA. 
The National Military Commission (NMC) is in charge of formulating and issuing the 
party’s policy on military affairs.59 The National United Front Commission (NUFC) is 
primarily tasked to formulate programs of action to attract the middle class and independent 
political groups to support the party’s cause in urban areas supported by National 
Organizational Department (NOD), which organizes and develops open mass 
movements.60 The National Finance Commission (NFC) is in charge of formulating plans 
and policies to generate funds for the party, while the International Finance Commission 
(IFC) focuses on all financial dealings of the party, including those involving foreign 
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supporters and resources.61 The International Department (ID) carries out an international 
propaganda campaign and maintains ties with communist parties abroad.62 Meanwhile, the 
National Education Department (NED) is tasked with ensuring that the political and 
ideological consciousness of cadres is maintained.63 Figure 1 illustrates the CPP-NPA 
organizational structure. 
 
Figure 1. CPP-NPA-NDF Organizational Structure.64 
To implement the policy of centralized leadership and de-centralized operations, 
the CPP created territorial committees that oversee the party’s activities and expansion 
nationwide. Territorial committees or Regional Party Committees (RPC) are the highest 
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organ of the party in their area of jurisdiction.65 Similar to the national organ, the RPCs 
also maintain their respective functional staffs with tasks similar to those of their national 
counterparts, differing only by the jurisdiction that they cover. Each RPC exercises control 
and supervision over the different Front Committees (FC) and Guerilla Fronts (GF) 
operating under its jurisdiction. A typical RPC exercises control and supervision of three 
or four Front Committees/Guerilla Fronts with each FC consisting of at least two 
platoons.66 A GF is the politico-military geographical unit of the CPP-NPA that carries out 
party building and armed struggle in the countryside.67 Figure 2 illustrates the typical 
organizational structure of an RPC. 
 
Figure 2. Typical Regional Party Committee Organizational Structure.68  
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In the CPP-NPA’s effort to use the island environment of the country to its 
advantage, the CPP-NPA has established bases in remote mountain areas found throughout 
the country to force government forces to engage them on multiple fronts.69 According to 
Philippine Revolution Web Central (PRWC), the official internet portal of the CPP-NPA, 
by the mid-1990s, the NPA was able to establish 14 Regional Operational Commands 
(ROC): five are operating in each of Luzon and Mindanao, while four operate in the 
Visayas (see Figure 3). Together, these give the CPP/NPA both broad reach and protection. 
Each ROC is composed of five to seven guerilla fronts, with each GF having two platoons, 
which, in turn, has three squads of five to seven personnel.70 
 
Figure 3. Regional Operational Commands of the NPA.71  
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2. Trends and Strength 
As already noted, the communist insurgents have used the geographical situation 
of the country to their advantage. The geographical make-up of the country naturally favors 
the PPW principle of encircling the cities from the countryside. The numerous mountain 
ranges and dense forests are well suited to provide the insurgents with stable guerilla bases 
in the countryside that help them to gradually advance to urban centers.72  
Further, the communist insurgents in the three main island groups of the Philippines 
have different tasks. Those in Luzon serve as the link of the CPP-NPA to other provinces 
and regions throughout the country. Luzon also houses the national organizations of the 
insurgents. Visayas facilitates the movement of CPP-NPA cadres from Luzon to Mindanao 
and vice versa, by providing sanctuaries for the insurgents. While Mindanao draws the 
attention of counterinsurgent forces from Luzon, this region also provides material 
resources, such as money from the revolutionary taxation to support the communist 
insurgency in the different parts of the country. 
Figure 4 illustrates trends in NPA strength from 1981 to 2019, as measured by the 
number of NPA members, firearms, and captured barangays (villages). From the NPA’s 
initial strength of 60 members in 1968, the organization has steadily grown to 
approximately 6,000 key personnel and 3,000 arms, and it controlled approximately 1,000 
barangays by 1981. The NPA reached its peak of approximately 25,000 members in 1987. 
This drastic rise is attributed to abuses during martial law in the 1970s and first half of the 
1980s, worsening poverty, and deepening corruption in the country.73  
Although the NPA’s growth through the 1980s resulted in greater military and 
political success for the insurgents, their rapid expansion also spawned new problems for 
the communist insurgents, such as logistics and communication. Their larger formations 
also made it more difficult for them to move undetected. Moreover, difficulty in hiding 
their forces made them vulnerable to intensified offensive campaigns by the government 
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forces in the late 1980s. At the same time, an internal rift within the CPP-NPA organization 
posed a significant problem, with some Central Committee members in the northern part 
of the country advocating for an intensified offensive against the government forces. But 
perhaps a lack of foreign support constitutes one of the most conspicuous weakness of the 
CPP-NPA, and it has hindered their expansion and provided an opportunity for the 
government forces to exploit.74 
 
Figure 4. NPA Resources from 1981 to 2019, Relative to Major Events.75  
A steep decline in CPP-NPA membership between 1989 and 1995 saw its numbers 
significantly reduced to around 6,000. The NPA’s decline continued in the 1990s due to 
various setbacks, which were attributed to several factors, including sustained government 
military operations, internal rifts within the organization, the arrest of key leaders, financial 
constraints, negotiations with the government, and the fall of socialist regimes in Eastern 
Europe and the Soviet Union, which reduced their legitimacy.76 These setbacks forced the 
CPP-NPA leadership to study and reconsider their approach.  
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In December 1991, the CPP Central Committee issued a directive from its 
Chairman Jose Maria Sison entitled “Reaffirm Our Basic Principles and Rectify the 
Errors.”77 The document clarified several basic principles that the party needed to adhere 
to in order to regain ground. Foremost is upholding the Marxist-Leninist and Mao Zedong 
ideologies and the continued reliance on the strategy of PPW.78 
By the late 1990s to early 2000s, a rise occurred in the number of communist 
insurgents in the country. The Ramos administration deemed it necessary to transfer the 
primary responsibility of internal security operations to the Philippine National Police 
(PNP) to allow the AFP to focus on external defense.79 These actions proved to be a 
mistake, since the PNP was unsuccessful in accomplishing their task. The resurgence of 
the NPA was observed by the AFP in 1995, with the CPP stating in 1997 that it was able 
to recover its 1983 mass base level.80 According to Santos et al., this resurgence was 
attributed to CPP’s reaffirmation of the PPW and the NPA’s focus on conducting mass 
efforts in the countryside. By 2001, the CPP-NPA membership had grown to around 
12,000, which Santos et al. attributed to the shift in the focus of the government forces 
from the communist insurgency to terrorism and the Muslim insurgency in the southern 
part of the country. By 2009, the government and AFP had reduced the number of CPP-
NPA members to around 4,000, a level that held steady for the next decade. 
3. Leadership 
Jose Maria Sison, the founding leader of the CPP-NPA, was born to an affluent 
landowner in the province of Ilocos Sur in the northwestern part of Luzon.81 He studied 
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the works of nationalist writers, such as Teodoro Agoncillo and Claro Recto, and the works 
of Karl Marx and Vladimir Lenin. Nonetheless, Sison was most heavily influenced by 
Mao’s teachings.82  
After several years of insurgent activities, 1976 was a challenging year for the CPP, 
with several of its top leaders arrested. Among those were Central Committee members 
Juanito Canlas, Cesario Diego, Saturnino Ocampo, Victor Corpus, Bernabe Buscayno, and 
Renato Casipe.83 In November the following year, CPP Chairman Jose Maria Sison was 
also captured.84 Despite these setbacks in leadership, the CPP-NPA continued in its armed 
struggle as new leaders emerged. After Sison’s capture, Rodolfo Salas assumed leadership 
of the CPP.85 Under Salas’ leadership, the CPP decided to strengthen its United Front 
machinery as it formally introduced the National Democratic Front to the public.86 
Subsequently, Sison was reelected to Executive Committee of the CPP after his release 
from prison in 1986.87 The CPP’s POLITBORO, however, did not allow Sison to assume 
the chairmanship of the party since he had relocated to the Netherlands.88  
During the 10th CPP plenum in October 1992, Sison was again re-elected as 
chairman of the CPP with Benito Tiamzon as vice-chairman and Wilma Austria-Tiamzon 
as secretary general.89 Their election started an internal rift within the organization, with 
several high-ranking CPP-NPA leaders opposing Sison’s leadership and his rectification 
campaign. Among them were Romulo Kintanar, Ricardo Reyes, and Benjamin De Vera.90 
The rift resulted in a split of the party into two factions, the “reaffirmist” faction under 
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Sison and the “rejectionist” faction under the three opposition leaders. This internal split 
greatly affected not only the party but also the NPA and the NDF.91 Sison’s group 
eventually emerged successful. Since the launching of the rectification campaign, the CPP-
NPA gradually recovered and expanded its influence in the countryside.92 
This chapter has discussed the origins and the reemergence of communism in the 
Philippines, both of which were driven by deeply rooted inequities in land ownership, labor 
rights, and access to political and social power. Since the reestablishment of communist 
insurgency in the Philippines in 1969, the CPP-NPA has gradually evolved into a more 
potent threat against the Philippine government. From a small town in Capas, Tarlac, in 
the northern Philippines, the CPP-NPA was able to expand its influence in the country, 
stretching as far as Mindanao in the South. Although its numbers have been significantly 
reduced, its continued existence is attributed to its ability to adapt to the changing situation 
in the country, tap into the fundamental grievances of society, and establish a highly 
structured and disciplined organization. The CPP-NPA’s ability to mobilize the masses 
through agitation and propaganda activities, hit and run tactics against government security 
forces, and its well-established organizational structure represent the primary reasons why 
the CPP-NPA remains a potent security threat in the Philippines.  
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III. THE CAMPAIGNS AND THEIR RESULTS 
The Philippine government has adopted various counterinsurgency strategies to 
defeat the communist insurgency in the country. After the 1986 EDSA People Power 
Revolution, the Corazon Aquino and Ramos administrations adopted a strategy that they 
called “national reconciliation with justice” in dealing with the communist insurgents.93 
The Gloria Macapagal Arroyo administration implemented a holistic approach, while 
President Benigno Aquino III, the son of the former president, adopted a people-centered, 
multi-stakeholder approach in dealing with the communist insurgents. To support the 
different administrations’ counterinsurgency strategies, the AFP implemented several 
campaign plans.  
This chapter examines the campaigns implemented after the 1986 EDSA People 
Power Revolution, specifically the AFP’s Oplan Lambat Bitag (Net Trap), Oplan Bantay-
Laya (Guarding Freedom) and Internal Peace and Security Plan (IPSP) Bayanihan (Civic 
Unity). It first describes the campaigns’ geographic presence, objectives, strategies, 
targeted concerns and resources. Oplan’s Lambat-Bitag and Bantay-Laya primarily 
focused on military actions to destroy the armed group and the political structures of the 
communist insurgents in the barangays using the Clear-Hold-Develop-Consolidate (C-H-
D-C) model. IPSP Bayanihan introduced a paradigm shift from the military-centric to a 
people-centered security approach. The chapter then examines the different operational 
accomplishments of each of the campaigns, concluding that the three campaigns were 
successful in reducing the CPP-NPA’s military capabilities; however, the AFP failed to 
completely defeat the insurgents because of shifts in the AFP’s and government’s priorities. 
Lastly, it lays out the external support that the Philippine government received during the 
implementation of each campaign, finding that the international security partnerships that 
the Philippine government entered into focused on maritime security and counterterrorism 
operations, not counterinsurgency operations. Thus, such security partnerships did little to 
help the AFP defeat the communist insurgency in the country. 
 
93 Morales, “Perpetual War: The Philippine Insurgencies,” 29–30. 
28 
A. OPLAN LAMBAT BITAG (NET TRAP) 
Oplan Lambat Bitag (Net Trap) was first implemented from 1989 to 1992 as part 
of the counterinsurgency efforts of the Aquino administration and continued under the 
Ramos administration from 1992 to 1996. At the beginning, most activities were carried 
out in Luzon where the CPP-NPA had established strong guerilla fronts, which eventually 
spread to Mindanao.94 The campaign was primarily led by the Philippine Army and, to a 
lesser degree, involved the government and private sector, putting an emphasis on the 
“right” mix of civil-military operations, intelligence, and combat operations against the 
insurgents. Combining these coercive and persuasive strategies, the “Clear-Hold-
Consolidate-Develop (C-H-C-D)” concept was also first introduced as a means to counter 
the insurgents’ strategy in the countryside.95  
As described by Stephen Watts et al., under C-H-D-C operational methodology, 
during the Clear Stage, the AFP employed its mobile forces to destroy armed groups and 
dismantle the insurgents’ politico-military structures in insurgency-affected areas. The 
authors explained that the Hold stage used territorial forces to secure cleared areas and 
facilitate the reestablishment of government control by elected and appointed officials.96 
In the Develop stage, government agencies conducted activities to pursue progressive 
activities such as infrastructure development.97 Finally, Watts et al. summarized the 
Consolidate stage as involving the collaboration of several national and local government 
agencies to strengthen government. The Development and Consolidation Stages were 
designed to begin addressing the socio-economic and political grievances of those targeted 
by the CPP-NPA. At the time of the campaign’s implementation, the AFP also initiated 
reforms as part of an effective counterinsurgency operation to reeducate soldiers on the 
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importance of adhering to the principles of human rights and winning population support 
for an effective counterinsurgency operation.98  
1. Campaign Objectives and Strategies 
Under Oplan Lambat Bitag, the AFP’s strategy was focused on dismantling the 
communist insurgency’s political and military structures in barangays.99 The campaign 
was to be implemented by the different Area Commands combining combat operations, 
intelligence operations, and civil-military operations (CMO). To most effectively utilize 
its forces, the AFP tasked specific units to perform specific functions. Combat operations 
were primarily conducted by infantry battalions to target selected strategic guerilla fronts 
and aimed at inflicting heavy casualties among the armed insurgents.100 The infantry 
battalions of the Philippine Army were deployed to target the armed groups in the 
countryside with the support of the different intelligence units under the Intelligence 
Service of the AFP.101 In doing so, intelligence officers concentrated efforts at recruiting 
informants to track the insurgents’ movements and discover their plans. CMO were focused 
on targeting insurgents and their supporters through psychological warfare to break their 
will to fight, induce mass surrender, and eventually provide an avenue for peace and 
reconciliation.102 To effectively utilize its forces, the AFP tasked specific units to perform 
specific functions. CMO units utilized the media—print, radio, and television—to address 
and cover a wide area of audiences, emphasizing the gains of the government’s initiatives. 
2. Operational Accomplishments 
Of the three campaigns, Oplan Lambat Bitag seemed to be the most effective in 
terms of achieving military objectives, since it was successful in reducing the number of 
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CPP-NPA combatants from about 25,200 in 1987 to 14,800 in 1991.103 This plan was 
initially successful because it focused on addressing the different tactics being 
implemented by the NPA fighters in the countryside.104 Figure 5 shows the trend in CPP-
NPA capabilities from 1989 to 1998, the periods when the AFP implemented Oplan 
Lambat Bitag. The figure shows the trend in the number of communist insurgents 
neutralized, which include those who were killed, apprehended, or surrendered, and the 
number of firearms gained, which included those that were captured or recovered by the 
government forces.105  
 
Figure 5. Trend in CPP-NPA Capabilities (1989–1998).106  
In terms of enemy neutralized, 1991 proved the most productive year for the AFP, 
as it neutralized 36 percent more communist insurgents (1,258 total) that year than it did 
in 1990. In terms of firearms gained by the government, 1989–1993 reflected the greatest 
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government gains with a steady increase of recovered firearms by government forces, 
starting at 496 and peaking at 676. Beginning in 1993, however, there was a decline in 
terms of reduction of CPP-NPA military capabilities, the lowest being observed in  
1996 when the number of combatants neutralized totaled 81 and arms obtained totaled 64. 
This low point is attributed not to a severely neutralized opponent but to the transfer of 
Internal Security Operation (ISO) responsibility from the AFP to the PNP during the 
Ramos administration.107  
After the transfer of ISO responsibility to PNP in 1996, a gradual increase in terms 
of CPP-NPA military capabilities was observed. This trend began in 1997 and extended to 
the early 2000s. According to Roy Devesa, this gradual increase was attributed to the lack 
of preparedness on the part of the PNP to take over the ISO responsibilities, because the 
PNP was preoccupied with anti-criminality operations, which is detached from the 
counterinsurgency efforts of the government.108 Author Soliman Santos also attributes the 
CPP-NPA’s resurgence in 1997 to the groups’ reaffirmation of the protracted nature of the 
war and the NPA’s renewed focus on organizing work.109 The rectification that the CPP-
NPA members had made within their organization allowed them to reorganize and 
consolidate support in their base areas. 
3. External Support 
During Oplan Lambat-Bitag, President Corazon Aquino’s administration primarily 
received military support from the United States in its counterinsurgency operations. In 
1988, when the CPP-NPA was at its peak strength, the United States advised the 
administration to launch a total war against the CPP-NPA.110 Acting on this advice, the 
Aquino administration intensified its counterinsurgency strategy, and the AFP for its part 
implemented Oplan Lambat-Bitag, primarily the Clear stage and first half of the Hold 
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stage. This resulted in the drastic reduction in CPP-NPA capabilities, particularly in 
manpower and firearms. 
The 1991 country-study report about the Philippines for the U.S. Library of 
Congress indicated that in 1990 U.S. foreign aid to the Philippines reached nearly US$500 
million.111 It further revealed that, during the 1990s, the United States and Japan were key 
donors to the Philippine Assistance Plan, which was a multilateral aid initiative that 
included debt relief and new credit. This foreign aid, however, focused on aiding the 
Philippines in its structural reforms and not particularly to aid the AFP in the 
implementation of its counterinsurgency campaign.  
B. OPLAN BANTAY-LAYA (GUARDING FREEDOM) 
The Oplan Bantay Laya (Guarding Freedom) campaign was adopted by the Arroyo 
administration and executed in two iterations: Oplan Bantay-Laya I (2002–2006) and 
Oplan Banta-Laya II (2007–2010), the latter of which was intended to provide the AFP 
and its subordinate units strategic guidance for ISO.112 The plans represented the AFP’s 
strategic orientation that links to national plans and strategy.113 Under the campaign, the 
AFP’s mission was to “conduct ISO nationwide to destroy Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) 
soonest, decisively defeat the armed group of the Local Communist Movement and contain 
Southern Philippines Secessionist Groups (SPSGs) in order to establish a physically and 
psychologically secured environment conducive to national development.”114 As this 
mission statement suggests, defeating the communist insurgents was not the government’s 
highest priority, but a valiant effort was made against this ongoing threat. 
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1. Campaign Objectives and Strategies 
The overall objective of Oplan Bantay Laya was to neutralize and dismantle the 
political and militant machinery of the communist insurgency in the countryside.115 As 
with its predecessor, Oplan Lambat-Bitag, the main implementors of the campaign were 
the different Area Commands. Oplan Bantay Laya also added the Clear-Hold-Support (C-
H-S) methodology in consonance with the C-H-D-C method to neutralize the insurgents in 
key areas and allow for the transfer of security responsibility from the AFP to the local 
government units. In C-H-S operational methodology, during the Clear Stage, the AFP 
used its mobile forces to destroy the armed component of the insurgents.116 The AFP 
further explained that in the Hold Stage it uses the different territorial forces to secure the 
cleared areas and facilitate the entry of other government agencies for consolidation and 
development activities. The AFP described the Support stage as involving the AFP and 
other national and local government agencies collaborating to implement developmental 
activities that would address the root causes of conflict.117 
2. Operational Accomplishments 
Under Oplan Bantay-Laya, the AFP further intensified its operations against the 
CPP-NPA to defeat the communist insurgents by 2010. The premature transfer of ISO 
responsibility to the PNP during the Ramos administration resulted in the CPP-NPA 
recovering its lost grounds both in terms of number of combatants and territory. 
Consequently, the ISO responsibility reverted to the AFP. Figure 6 shows the trend in 
AFP’s effort to reduce CPP-NPA military capabilities during the implementation of Oplan 
Bantay-Laya I and II. Whereas the AFP neutralized 104 communist combatants at the end 
of Oplan Lambat-Bitag in 1998, by 2002 it had removed 889 combatants from the theater. 
At the end of Oplan Lambat-Bitag in 1998, 218 weapons had changed hands, as compared 
to 476 weapons in 2002 at the start of Oplan Bantay-Laya I.  
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Figure 6. Trend in CPP-NPA Capabilities (2001–2010).118  
During the early implementation of the campaign there was a decline in the 
neutralization of CPP-NPA combatants. According to an AFP campaign assessment in 
2003, this was attributed to the AFP’s and government’s focus being on Abu Sayyaf Group 
(ASG) and separatists in the southern part of the country.119 The number of weapons seized 
also experienced an early retrenchment after initial success. Yet, the campaign gained 
ground to have its most significant military successes from 2005 to 2007, removing in these 
three years a total of 4,519 NPA combatants and 2,284 firearms.120 The AFP attributed 
this progress to more effective utilization of combat, intelligence, and psychological 
operations.  
These operational successes, however, were short lived as the Arroyo 
administration faced several challenges that involved the military, drawing the attention of 
both the administration and the AFP away from the campaign. As illustrated in Figure 6, 
in the last years of the campaign, the number of neutralized combatants fell from 1,296 in 
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2008 to 597 in 2010, while the number of weapons seized or turned over to the government 
held steady for the campaign’s final four years, ranging between 747 and 805 each year.  
In 2006, a coup plot was discovered and forced President Arroyo to declare a state 
of emergency on February 24, 2006.121 This was followed by the Manila Peninsula 
Rebellion in which detained Magdalo mutineers from the 2003 Oakwood Mutiny seized 
the hotel for which the event is named.122 Another factor that contributed to the decline in 
accomplishment is the frequent change in AFP leadership. Jaemark Tordecilla, in his report 
for the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, indicated that during the nine-year 
tenure of President Arroyo, she appointed a total of 12 generals as AFP Chief of Staff, 
seven of whom only held the position for less than a year, with one general serving for just 
69 days.123 Tordecilla further argues that this frequent change in leadership hindered the 
AFP from pursuing needed reforms within the organization. 
3. External Support 
The Arroyo administration continued to work with the United States and other 
regional security partners to pursue the administration’s national security agenda. In 2001, 
the Philippines was among the first countries in Southeast Asia to support the George W. 
Bush administration’s global war on terror (GWOT). For example, the Philippines allowed 
the use of its airspace and seaports in the efforts to support the U.S. military operations in 
Afghanistan.124 In 2007, the government signed the Philippine-Australia Status-of-Forces 
Agreement (SOFA), which was similar to the Philippine-U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement 
(VFA).125 Under the agreement, the Philippine government provided legal assurances in 
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the conduct of joint-counterterrorism exercises between the AFP and the Australian 
Defense Force (ADF). It also gave the ADF the opportunity to advise on the logistics and 
acquisition policy of the AFP.126   
While the Arroyo administration received a boost in its campaign against 
communist insurgents in 2004, when the CPP-NPA was blacklisted for its terrorist 
activities by several countries—notably, the United States, Australia, Britain, and the 
European Union (EU)—most military partnerships that the Arroyo government entered 
into did not focus on the communist insurgency and instead compelled an AFP shift in 
forces to other areas. The U.S.-Philippines partnership in 2001, for instance, focused on 
defeating terrorist groups in the southern Philippines while the Philippines-Australia SOFA 
also focused on counterterrorism primarily in Mindanao and development of maritime 
security capabilities. The United States in particular has directly supported the Philippine 
military and police in their counterterrorism efforts, deploying 1,200 advisors as early as 
2001, most of them in the southern Philippines.127 In line with this effort, a U.S. Joint 
Special Operations Forces (SOF) Task Force was deployed in Mindanao purposely to 
provide antiterrorism training, assist in intelligence gathering using state-of-the-art 
equipment, and provide advice to AFP forces deployed in the area.128 The equipment and 
expertise shared by the Task Force had significantly contributed to the AFP’s capability in 
pursuing terrorist threats in Mindanao. 
C. INTERNAL PEACE AND SECURITY PLAN—IPSP BAYANIHAN (CIVIC 
UNITY) 
From 2011 to 2016, the AFP implemented IPSP Bayanihan (a Tagalog word that 
translates roughly as “civic unity”) as part of the security agenda of the Benigno Aquino 
administration, which was said to be a paradigm shift on how the AFP viewed its role and 
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performed its functions.129 The plan was crafted to guide the AFP in performing its 
functions of protecting the people and the state, which represented a major shift for the 
AFP from a primarily militaristic mindset to “a people-centered security strategy.”130 It 
required the AFP to set up a stronger mechanism for transparency and accountability and 
to provide a venue for security convergence at the tactical level.131  
The AFP did not craft the IPSP Bayanihan alone; instead, it involved the academe, 
other government agencies and civil society organizations, in the development of IPSP 
Bayanihan. Under the campaign, the AFP’s mission was to “conduct support operations to 
win the peace in order to help the Filipino nation create an environment conducive for 
sustainable development and a just and lasting peace.”132 It was prescribed to be not only 
“whole of government” but “whole of nation,” unlike the Oplan Bantay-Laya, which had 
a stronger focus on combat and eventually was diverted primarily to counter threats in the 
southern Philippines.  
The six-year time frame of IPSP Bayanihan was divided into two phases. In the 
first phase (2011–2013), the AFP was focused on addressing the armed threat groups, 
particularly the CPP-NPA.133 This early focus on military action was not much different 
from the two previously described campaigns. However, in the second phase (2014–2016), 
the AFP was to devote its efforts and resources to handing over responsibilities to 
concerned local government units, which were to play a principal role in ensuring the 
internal peace and security, as well as provision of government services. This deliberate 
focus on empowering locals represented a significant shift. 
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1. Campaign Objectives and Strategies 
Rather than the traditional defeat of the enemy’s armed group, IPSP Bayanihan’s 
primary objective was winning the peace by engaging the different stakeholders in the 
government’s peace and security efforts.134 The published IPSP Bayanihan document 
states that to accomplish this, the campaign was anchored on two strategic approaches: “the 
whole-of-nation approach (WNA) and the people-centered security approach.” The 
document further described the WNA as based on the concept that security is not just the 
responsibility of security forces and government institutions. Rather, it is a shared 
responsibility that also involves the community and civil society.135 The people-centered 
security approach focuses on the people, putting primacy on human rights and exploring 
different ways to promote security and safety locally, based on specific needs and realities 
on the ground.136 The implementation of the campaign does not only involve external 
application of engaging the different stakeholders. Internally, the AFP as an institution has 
also implemented measures to ensure that soldiers understand and appreciate the strategic 
concept of the campaign. IPSP Bayanihan became part of the modules being taught to 
soldiers in their units and individual trainings.  
2. Operational Accomplishments 
From 2011 to 2016, IPSP Bayanihan was successful in reducing CPP-NPA 
capabilities, as signified by the number of active combatants and firearms and the affected 
barangays freed. Figure 7 shows that in terms of the number of personnel neutralized, 
which includes those who were apprehended, killed, and surrendered, the AFP was 
successful in reducing the NPA’s strength. For the entire period, a total of 4,722 CPP-NPA, 
averaging 787 per year, were neutralized, which was attributed to the increased operational 
tempo in the conduct of combat operations by the various Area Commands.137 In terms of 
firearms gained, the AFP was able to capture a total of 2,750 weapons, an average of 458 
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per year. The campaign, however, lagged in terms of reducing the number of affected 
barangays, with 579 barangays declared as cleared with local control in place, which is an 
average of 97 per year. Although 167 barangays were cleared in 2011, just 71 were 
rehabilitated in 2016. The AFP attributed the decline in reduction of CPP-NPA capabilities 
from 2014 to 2015 to the shift in focus in the AFP from internal defense to external defense 
in a dispute in the South China Sea.138   
 
Figure 7. Trend in CPP-NPA Capabilities (2011–2016).139  
3. External Support 
As with the previous administrations, the Aquino administration continued to 
develop and enhance its security partnership with the United States and its regional security 
allies, Australia and Japan. As with previous administrations, these international 
agreements focused on counterterrorism operations—not counterinsurgency operations—
and maritime security but did little to support the AFP’s efforts against the communist 
insurgency. 
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In 2014, the Philippines and United States signed the Enhanced Defense 
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) to further deepen the defense cooperation between the 
two countries.140 The agreement allows the U.S. military rotational access to Philippine 
bases. After the agreement was signed, it was reported that the United States allocated 
US$50 million and US$40 million in military aid to the Philippines for 2014 and 2015, 
respectively.141 In addition to this military aid, the U.S. government also provided the 
Philippines another US$50 million for the AFP’s military training and intelligence 
operations to support its counterterrorism operations.142   
In 2016, the Philippines and Japan signed a new defense pact to further bolster the 
defense and security cooperation between the two countries.143 According to Renato Cruz 
De Castro, the agreement established the “legal parameters that allows the transfer of 
defense equipment and technology from Japan to the Philippines.” De Castro further argues 
that this agreement is mutually beneficial for the two countries: for the Philippines, it will 
facilitate the “transfer of defense equipment and technology” from Japan; for Japan, it will 
“advance the development and establishment of technological bases of Japan’s growing 
defense industry.”144  
D. CONCLUSION 
AFP’s Oplan Lambat Bitag and Oplan Bantay-Laya campaigns had focused on 
defeating and destroying the armed group and the political structures of the communist 
insurgents in the barangays, using the C-H-D-C model. IPSP Bayanihan, on the other hand, 
introduced a paradigm shift that implemented a WNA and people-centered security 
strategy. During this time, Philippine government received significant support from its 
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allies and security partners, particularly the United States, Australia, and Japan. This 
support, however, was not focused on defeating communist insurgents but instead on 
counterterrorism, maritime security operations, and developing defense industry. All three 
campaigns had positive results in terms of reducing the CPP-NPA capabilities. Despite 
this, they fell short in accomplishing their objectives of defeating the communist 
insurgents. The next chapter analyzes the factors that contributed to the shortcomings of 
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IV. ANALYZING THE CAMPAIGNS: WHY THE CPP-NPA 
HAS NOT YET BEEN DEFEATED 
Unresolved social, political, and economic conditions in the country provided the 
CPP-NPA with grievances to exploit and to rally the masses to their cause. Widespread 
poverty and corruption, ignorance, and injustices—including neglect and coercion—by the 
government brought increased suffering and dissatisfaction among the people, making 
them vulnerable to CPP-NPA’s agitation and propaganda.145 To address these issues, the 
Philippine government launched several whole-of-government counterinsurgency 
strategies, which were only partially implemented and thus only partially successful. The 
AFP, for its part, implemented several campaign plans to support the different 
administrations’ national security agendas, with three of the most significant efforts being 
the campaigns studied in this thesis.  
This chapter examines the factors that hampered the implementation of AFP’s 
Oplan Lambat Bitag, Oplan Bantay-Laya, and IPSP Bayanihan. This chapter argues that 
inadequate sustainment capability, lack of support from government institutions, and the 
challenges to political leadership are the primary factors that hindered the AFP campaigns 
and their overriding objective of defeating the CPP-NPA. The chapter begins by describing 
the socio-economic conditions during the implementation of each campaign. It then 
discusses and analyzes the different factors that hindered the implementation of the three 
broadly scoped AFP campaigns. 
A. SOCIO-ECONOMIC CONDITIONS  
The campaigns being implemented as part of the government’s overall 
counterinsurgency strategy encountered similar socio-political and economic problems that 
hindered their implementation. Oplan Lambat-Bitag (Net Trap), was implemented during 
the Aquino (1986–1992) and Ramos (1992–1998) administrations, Oplan Bantay Laya 
(Guarding Freedom) during the Arroyo administration (2001–2010), and IPSP Bayanihan 
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(Civic Unity) during the Benigno Aquino (2011–2016) administration. This section 
analyzes the different socio-political and economic factors that each administration faced 
and how they affected the implementation of the campaigns.  
1. Oplan Lambat Bitag (Net Trap) 
The deep and systemic problems that paved the way for the reemergence of the 
CPP-NPA in the late 1960s were still present during the 1980s. Poverty, corruption, and 
inequality were among the problematic socio-economic conditions when the AFP’s Oplan 
Lambat Bitag was first implemented in 1989, and little progress was made in overcoming 
them.146 When Corazon Aquino came into power after the People Power Revolution, 
which overthrew Ferdinand Marcos’ dictatorship, she inherited a bankrupt economy and 
debt-ridden country.147  
The Philippines was among the poorest countries in the region, and the country’s 
per capita GDP growth averaged close to zero during the Aquino administration.148 Ronald 
Dolan, in his country report about the Philippines for the U.S. Library of Congress, 
indicated that the countryside had the highest concentration of the poor, with more than 80 
percent of the poorest families living in rural areas.149 The majority of them were landless 
farmers, fishermen, and manual laborers. He further indicated that during martial law under 
Marcos, from 1971 to 1985, urban poverty had increased by 13 percent, with a majority of 
the urban poor living in crowded slums.150 Capitalizing on the perceived government 
neglect, CPP-NPA agitation and propaganda efforts targeted the rural and urban poor. The 
poverty incidence rate in the Philippines was 44 percent in 1986 when Aquino became 
president and 32 percent in 1997 before the end of the Ramos administration.151  
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Initially, after the overthrow of the Marcos dictatorship, the Philippines entered a 
new and successful phase of counterinsurgency, as measured by the steep drop in CPP-
NPA capabilities between 1991 and 1995 and which were held at low levels throughout 
the Ramos administration (see Figure 7).152 The Aquino administration promoted 
“national reconciliation with justice,” which increased focus on diplomatic solutions.153 
The AFP’s new counterinsurgency strategy continued its offensive operations against 
combatants, while the concept of civilian protection was incorporated into government 
action, although not well implemented.154  President Aquino tried to pursue reconciliation 
with communist insurgents by engaging in peace negotiations as part of her 
administration’s broader internal stability strategy. To demonstrate the government’s 
sincerity, she ordered the release of all political prisoners who were imprisoned during the 
Marcos administration, including the top two leaders of the CPP, Jose Maria Sison and 
Bernabe Buscayno.155 Increased involvement by civilian government agencies and non-
governmental organizations was part of the Aquino administration’s plan to defeat the 
insurgents and attain socio-economic development.156  
When President Ramos was elected in 1992, he continued the AFP’s “Clear-Hold-
Consolidate-Develop (C-H-C-D)” activities as well as expanded the government’s political 
policies of peace and national reconciliation.157 He created and organized the National 
Unification Commission (NUC), which had helped in reducing the high numbers of 
political prisoners, including those allegedly linked to the CPP.158 The NUC is composed 
of diverse members coming from the legislative and executive branches of the government 
and the private sector. NUC’s primary purpose is to investigate and recommend solutions 
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to address the root causes of armed conflicts and social unrest.159 The commission became 
the primary government unit responsible for overseeing the execution of the National 
Program for Unification and Development (NPUD), which ran the amnesty program for 
secessionists, coup plotters, and insurgents willing to surrender.160 Furthermore, as part of 
the government efforts to show sincerity toward reconciliation, the Ramos administration 
repealed the Republic Act 1700, also known as the Anti-Subversion Law.161 As a result, 
the Communist Party became a legal political party and was allowed to participate in the 
government to express its social and political goals. 
Although the Aquino and Ramos administrations implemented several changes to 
fight corruption, the government, society, and politics were still perceived as highly 
corrupt. In the first corruption index published by Transparency International in 1995, the 
Philippines ranked 36 out of 41 countries, with a score of 2.77 in the corruption perception 
index, where a score of 10 reflected the least-corrupt countries.162 Transparency 
International’s corruption perception index “measures the levels public sector corruption” 
as perceived by international business people and financial journalists.163 By the end 
of the Ramos administration in 1998, the Philippines ranked 55 out of 85 countries with a 
score of 3.3, which was slightly higher than the 2.7 in 1995.164 Since then, the succeeding 
administrations have made several efforts to curb corruption, but little progress has 
been made. 
2. Oplan Bantay Laya (Guarding Freedom) 
When Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo became the president in January 2001, poverty 
and social inequality persisted in the country. According to a 2009 poverty statistics report 
 
159 Severo, “Philippine Counterinsurgency during the Presidencies of Magsaysay, Marcos, and 
Ramos: Challenges and Opportunities,” 79. 
160 Severo, 80–81. 
161 Severo, 82. 
162 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 1995 for the Philippines,” accessed 
April 14, 2021, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/1995. 
163 Transparency International. 
164 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 1998 for the Philippines,” accessed 
April 14, 2021, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/1998. 
47 
published by the Philippine Statistics Authority, the poverty rate had increased to 26 
percent, compared to 22 percent in 2003.165 As was the case under the Aquino 
administration, which dealt with multiple coup attempts and ongoing civil unrest, political 
instability was also rampant during the Arroyo administration.166  Several impeachment 
cases were hurled at the president, and several mass, predominantly nonviolent protest 
actions were launched by left-leaning and other civil-society organizations during her nine-
year term.  
Upon assuming the presidency, Arroyo envisioned establishing a strong republic to 
restore the nation’s credibility and stability in the eyes of its citizens and the world.167 Her 
administration recognized that insurgency still “posed a serious threat to national security” 
and that a need existed to institutionalize a government response to address it.168 The 
administration implemented what it called a Strategy of Holistic Approach, with Arroyo 
proclaiming Executive Order Number 21 in June 2001. Otherwise known as the “National 
Internal Security Plan,” this approach was “to integrate the political, economic, security 
and psycho-social response of the government in addressing the insurgency threats and root 
causes of conflict.”169 The Arroyo administration set three political objectives for its 
counterinsurgency strategy:  
First to enhance good governance by fighting corruption and promoting 
transparency and accountability. Second, accelerate programs to reduce 
poverty and promote respect for human rights and right to development. 
Third is to implement the left-hand and right-hand efforts which combines 
military operations and government agencies focused on socio-economic 
and psycho-social developments.170  
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Despite these stated political objectives, the Arroyo administration focused on military 
objectives to defeat the communist insurgents, unlike the Aquino and Ramos 
administrations which focused on “national reconciliation with justice.”  
Political scientists John Roberts and Peter Symonds emphasized that the corruption 
problem continued to persist in the Arroyo Administration, which was hounded by several 
corruption scandals of its own.171 The first corruption scandal centered around the claims 
that several of Arroyo’s relatives, specifically her husband, son, and brother-in-law, 
received jueteng (illegal numbers game) money. The second involved claims of fraud in 
the election in 2004, where it was alleged that Arroyo used her position to bolster her 
campaign and rig the election. The third involved the national broadband project known as 
the NBN-ZTE deal, which again involved her husband, who allegedly received kickbacks 
from the deal.172  
In the corruption index published by Transparency International, the Philippines 
ranked 65 out of 91 countries in 2001, with a score of 2.9, which was lower than the Ramos 
Administration’s 3.3 score in 1998.173 The Philippines continued to slip in global rankings 
during the Arroyo Administration, with the Philippines being ranked 146 out of 178 
countries, with a score of 2.4 by the end of her term.174 This was the lowest relative score 
that the Philippines received since Transparency International started publishing its global 
corruption perception index in 1995. 
 
171 Roberts and Symonds, “Political Turmoil Surrounds Philippines President Arroyo.” 
172 Jun Ledesma, “Letters from Davao: The National Broadband Network,ˮ Philippine News Agency, 
accessed April 14, 2021, https://www.pna.gov.ph/opinion/pieces/123-the-national-broadband-network. 
173 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2001 for the Philippines,” accessed 
April 14, 2021, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2001. 
174 Transparency International, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2010 for the Philippines,” accessed 
April 14, 2021, https://www.transparency.org/en/cpi/2010. 
49 
3. Internal Peace and Security Plan—IPSP Bayanihan (Civic Unity) 
When Benigno Aquino III assumed office in 2011, a perception of poor governance 
and massive corruption existed in the country.175 The national security agenda of President 
Aquino’s administration focused on the people and took a multi-stakeholder approach in 
addressing the peace and security concerns of the country. It emphasized four specific 
elements, namely “good governance, delivery of basic services, economic and sustainable 
development and security sector reform.”176  
Aquino instituted several reforms in the government to restore the public trust in 
the government and its institutions. For instance, the administration made significant gains 
in its fight against corruption. In the corruption perception index published by 
Transparency International, the Philippines ranked an average of 115 out of 178 countries 
during the B. Aquino III administration, compared to 146 in 2010 at the end of the Arroyo 
administration.177 By the end of the Aquino administration, the Philippines was ranked 
101. This gradual climb in the global rankings is attributed to the positive effects of several 
anti-corruption policies that the administration had implemented.  
IPSP Bayanihan acknowledged the large effect of the social and economic 
conditions on peace and security in the country. At the time the campaign was 
implemented, the country remained marred by unequal distribution of wealth and economic 
opportunities, which resulted in a wide income gap between social classes.178 The 
Philippine economy grew stronger before and after Aquino took power, with the national 
poverty rate declining from 26.6 percent in 2006 to 21.6 percent in 2015, despite the global 
economic recession of 2008–2009.179 From 2011 to 2016, the Aquino administration 
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continued to implement actions to reduce poverty and improve the living conditions of the 
people.  
The Aquino administration also faced several political challenges. The first was the 
Manila Hostage crisis in 2010, where eight Hong Kong tourists were killed by a lone 
gunman.180  The second was the Scarborough Shoal incident with China in 2012, a military 
stand-off that forced the Aquino administration to realize the need to fast track the AFP’s 
territorial defense capability build-up.181 These two incidents resulted in a shift in focus 
of the AFP from internal security to territorial defense. Lastly, the Mamasapano clash in 
January 2015, which was a botched Philippine National Police (PNP) operation against the 
foreign terrorist Marwan in Mamasapano, Maguindanao, that led to 67 deaths, 44 of them 
among the security forces.182 Aquino suffered a severe backlash because of this incident, 
with his approval rating crashing from 59 percent to 38 percent favorability, according to 
a Pulse Asia survey conducted after the incident.183 A Philippine Senate inquiry was 
conducted to investigate the incident, which included in its report that President Aquino 
committed an unlawful act for bypassing the chain of command when he allowed the 
suspended chief of the PNP to manage the operation.184 
B. FACTORS THAT HINDERED THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AFP 
CAMPAIGNS 
Although the three AFP campaigns studied here made significant gains in reducing 
the CPP-NPA capabilities, they still fell short of achieving their objectives of defeating the 
communist insurgency. This section analyzes how inadequate sustainment capability, lack 
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of support from government institutions, and challenges to political leadership hindered 
the implementation of all three AFP campaigns. 
1. Inadequate Sustainment Capability 
In the three campaigns implemented after 1986, the AFP fell short in its objective 
of defeating the communist insurgents, in part, because of the lack of sustainment 
capability. In the three campaigns reviewed, it should be noted that the AFP had been 
implementing the government’s counterinsurgency efforts alone. An International Crisis 
Group (ICG) report published in February 2011 indicated that senior AFP commanders 
attributed the failure of the AFP to defeat the CPP-NPA to the lack of sufficient resources, 
specifically in terms of personnel and equipment.185 The report further stated that to  
cope with the demands for the sustainment of the campaign, the AFP had to rely on  
“tribal militias and paramilitary forces.”186 Many of these groups were not properly trained 
and were poorly supervised, which made them susceptible to commit abuses damaging to 
the campaign.  
In his thesis, Col. Ricardo C. Morales argued that the weakness of Oplan Lambat-
Bitag was its inability to provide a suitable force/entity to sustain the gains in the 
barangays.187 Once the soldiers transferred to the next village, the barangay relapsed back 
under NPA control, since there was little to no effort from various government agencies to 
sustain the gains made by the AFP. This was also true for Oplan Bantay-Laya and IPSP 
Bayanihan where both campaigns also failed to capitalize on the gains made in cleared 
areas. 
Further aggravating these inadequate resources was the constant shifting of focus 
in the AFP. In his thesis, Lt. Col. Roy T. Devesa argued that the initial gains of Oplan 
Lambat Bitag had shifted the focus of the AFP to external and Moro-Muslim threats when 
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it prematurely transferred the ISO responsibility to the PNP.188 He further identified that 
the PNP was not prepared to handle ISO responsibility, because it was more preoccupied 
with criminality, drugs, and kidnappings that were also hounding the country. As a result 
of this decision, the last two stages of Oplan Lambat-Bitag were not fully implemented and 
gave the insurgents the opportunity to reorganize. Devesa also argued that the shift in focus 
of the AFP and the government toward external threats, the Moro-Muslim secessionists, 
and Muslim terrorists have placed the communist insurgents as a secondary or even tertiary 
priority.189 Fighting violent internal unrest on two different fronts had spread the AFP’s 
forces too thinly, especially after 9/11. Meager AFP resources were reallocated to the fight 
against Moro-Muslim secessionists, ASG, and other terrorist groups in the south. The 
vacuum left by the pull-back in government forces represented the primary reason why 
communist insurgents were able to return, because there was no effective security presence 
to hold cleared areas once the soldiers transferred to another area.190 
2. Lack of Support from Government Institutions  
In the three campaigns implemented since 1992, the AFP has been implementing 
the government’s counterinsurgency efforts with inadequate support from the rest of the 
government. In Oplan Lambat Bitag, for instance, the consolidate and develop aspects of 
the campaign relied heavily on the ability of the different government agencies to perform 
their community development tasks.191 The persistent shortcomings of the different 
government agencies to deliver the necessary development activities for the community 
after the AFP soldiers had left an area hindered the implementation of the campaign.192 In 
his thesis, Lt. Col. Pena argued that the civilian agencies’ lack of understanding and 
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appreciation of AFP efforts have contributed to their failure to perform their tasks in the 
consolidate and develop stages of the campaign.193  
The various national and local government agencies needed to deliver basic goods 
and services in conflict-affected areas to ensure that operational gains are sustained, that 
the community is insulated from communist insurgents, and that grievances are being 
addressed. A 2011 RAND report covering several case studies of insurgency found that the 
inability of successive administrations to deliver a competent and honest government has 
been a primary contributing factor to the persistent communist insurgency in the 
Philippines.194 According to Santos et al., in the three AFP campaigns, the government 
attributed the ongoing problem to the communists, because they exploit the social and 
political conditions in the countryside.195 Santos et al. also observed that, while this may 
be true, it is actually more complex, since the CPP-NPA cannot exist without the support 
of the people, particularly in the countryside, and underlying grievances have been strong 
motivating factors for alignment with the insurgents. 
A lack of understanding of the nature of the communist insurgency has contributed 
to the lack of government-agency support. Despite the whole-of-government approach laid 
out by multiple administrations, the insurgency has been viewed by many officials as a 
problem for the military.196 During the C. Aquino administration (1986–1992), the house 
of representatives had differing opinions about the insurgency problem. Some believed that 
it was a “purely local phenomena,” while others believed that it was solely a problem for 
the military to solve.197  The Ramos administration (1992–1998), which continued Oplan 
Lambat Bitag, faced the same problem as the previous administration: government 
agencies remained “poorly coordinated, under-sourced, and lacking in the training and 
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doctrine for counterinsurgency.”198 As a result, the government failed to deliver the 
necessary support in the consolidation and development stages of Oplan Lambat Bitag, 
which was quickly exploited by the CPP-NPA to recover and regain lost mass base.199  
The Arroyo administration (2001–2010) had a promising start as it implemented 
the Strategy of Holistic Approach (SHA) in implementing the revitalized campaign against 
communist insurgents. Devesa has argued that the SHA strategy addressed the government 
inactions that were being exploited by the CPP-NPA, since it recognized the need for an 
“unconventional and multi-dimensional response.”200 This strategy included four major 
components: “political-legal-diplomatic; socio-economic-psychosocial; peace and order-
security; and information with specific government agencies leading each component.”201 
Yet, the stated strategy was not necessarily reflected in the views of politicians and 
government officials, and other government agencies may not have been resourced to 
deliver. The main problem during the Arroyo administration, however, was that it focused 
government counterinsurgency efforts at the ASG, Moro-Muslim secessionists, and 
terrorist groups that rendered the communist insurgency as a lower priority. In fact, this 
concentration on counterterrorism and Mindanao was driven by the funding and priorities 
of the United States, on which the Philippines was partially dependent.202  
3. Challenges to Political Leadership 
Different political challenges in the government further hindered the 
implementation of the AFP campaigns and the whole-of-government response. The 
effectiveness of the counterinsurgency effort by the government relies on the commitment 
of the political leadership at the national and local levels.203 This section discusses failed 
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peace negotiations with the communists, bureaucratic inefficiency, and political instability 
as among the political leadership challenges faced by the different administrations.  
Each administration studied here tried to negotiate with the communist insurgents 
but ultimately failed because of the insurgents’ unrealistic demands and insincerity.204 It 
is important to note that the goal of the CPP is to replace the democratic government with 
a communist government. The CPP used peace negotiations as a means to reorganize and 
strengthen its ranks and gain political concessions from the government, which was 
manifested at the time of President C. Aquino when she ordered the release of all political 
prisoners, Jose Maria Sison and Bernabe Buscayno included.205 Several administrations 
followed this strategy. For example, President Ramos repealed the anti-subversion law, 
granted amnesty, and implemented the party-list voting system, which gave the CPP an 
opportunity to participate in the political affairs of the country.206 As a result, the CPP now 
had representation in the Philippine Congress, giving them the opportunity to destroy the 
government from within or, if they chose, fight for gains within the system. President B. 
Aquino also started his administration trying to negotiate peace with the communist 
insurgents.  
Bureaucratic inefficiency further contributed to the failure of the counterinsurgency 
strategies. All four administrations were hindered in fully implementing their 
counterinsurgency strategy because of the fragmented government structure and corrupt 
leaders. At the time of Presidents C. Aquino and Ramos, the “Philippine bureaucracy was 
perceived as generally weak, uncommitted to reform, uncoordinated, corrupt, financially 
burdened and incapable of coping with the needs of development and reform.”207 The 
inefficiency, inability, and unwillingness of the government to provide basic services to 
the people, particularly the impoverished masses in the countryside, provided the 
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communist insurgents with narratives to agitate, arouse, organize, and mobilize masses 
against the government.  
Political instability also proved a significant factor that affected the implementation 
of counterinsurgency strategy. Emmanuel Navarrete has argued that President C. Aquino’s 
peace and reconciliation policy was never fully realized because her administration faced 
several attempted coups.208 According to Navarrete, political survival became a central 
concern, one furthered by building alliances with various factions within the military, 
regardless of their effectiveness in the field or in carrying out the administration’s strategy. 
President Arroyo’s administration was also hounded by political instability, having faced 
several impeachment attempts and politically motivated rallies against her administration. 
Although President B. Aquino’s administration did not face any coup or impeachment 
attempts, his administration faced several destabilizing events—the Manila Hostage crisis, 
Scarborough Shoal incident, and Mamasapano clash—where their occurrence and the 
government response were heavily criticized by political opposition and the public.209  
C. CONCLUSION 
This chapter has compared the three primary AFP campaigns implemented after the 
1986 EDSA People Power Revolution. This examination has found that the inadequate 
sustainment capability by AFP and follow-on security forces, lack of support from 
government institutions, and centralized challenges to political leadership are the three 
common factors that negatively affected the AFP’s implementation of the campaign and 
accomplishment of its objectives. These, in turn, were caused by inadequate resources, lack 
of systemic reform, lack of a unified force within the government, instability, and other 
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V. DEVELOPMENT SUPPORT AND SECURITY PLAN— 
DSSP KAPAYAPAAN (PEACE) 
The various communist counterinsurgency campaigns launched by the AFP have 
gained significant headway over the years; however, they still fell short of accomplishing 
their objectives of defeating the communist insurgents. Using the lessons learned in the 
past campaigns, the AFP has implemented a new campaign, the Development Support and 
Security Plan (DSSP) Kapayapaan (Peace). This chapter describes the DSSP Kapayapaan 
campaign’s objectives, strategy, and new initiatives. It then argues that three new 
initiatives—creation of the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict 
(NTF-ELCAC), the Community Support Program (CSP), and the enhanced civil society 
partnership—are the primary factors contributing to recent gains made by the AFP and the 
Philippine government. In comparing the current campaign to previous AFP campaigns, 
the chapter finds that elements of DSSP Kapayapaan have made significant strides and 
have continuing potential to overcome two of three major shortcomings identified in the 
earlier campaigns. The chapter also finds that the creation of the NTF-ELCAC is providing 
the necessary structure to direct national and local government agencies to collaborate and 
converge counterinsurgency efforts with the AFP.  
A. OVERVIEW OF DSSP KAPAYAPAAN  
The DSSP Kapayapaan campaign is currently being implemented by the AFP 
against the CPP-NPA and other internal security threats. It is anchored in the President 
Rodrigo Duterte administration’s focus on “compassion and radical change encompassing 
the institutionalization of peace and order, ensuring inclusive socio-economic growth and 
development, streamlining bureaucracy, and pursuing an independent foreign policy.”210 
DSSP Kapayapaan started in January 2017 and is expected to culminate in June 2022, after 
the term of President Duterte has ended. As with the previous campaign, IPSP Bayanihan, 
DSSP Kapayapaan is a result of collaboration of the AFP with other government agencies 
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and civil society. Under the plan, the AFP puts emphasis on the possible areas of 
collaboration and convergence of the different local government units (LGUs) and other 
stakeholders. It also recognizes the importance of collaboration and convergence of 
different national government agencies and LGUs for realizing development, governance, 
and security.211 Like the previous AFP campaigns, DSSP Kapayapaan is intended to guide 
the AFP in performing its functions to support the overall national security and 
development initiatives of the government.212  
Campaign Objectives and Strategies 
The campaign adopted the Development-Governance-Security Framework (see 
Figure 8), which places national well-being at the center, recognizing the importance of 
having “a shared understanding of concept development, good governance, and security 
with all communities and all stakeholders.”213 The framework emphasizes sustainable 
development, human security, and good governance as a means of ending the communist 
insurgency. It also recognizes that “security should be an integral part of national 
development and good governance in order help foster the foundation for inclusive 
economic and human development.”214  
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Figure 8. Development-Governance-Security Framework.215  
Under the plan, the government includes the national government agencies which 
emphasize the importance of each agency being able to fulfill its mandate and 
responsibility to the people. It also includes the local government units, which tend to be 
the principal advocates of good governance and are considered the most essential links in 
the development and security of communities in their respective localities.216 Non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), civil society organizations (CSOs), and peoples’ 
organizations (POs) are also considered “vital partners as they bridge the service-delivery 
gaps in providing the basic needs of the people.”217 Academe includes those who are in 
the education community, who play a major role in development and security through their 
contributions in the fields of “technology research, conflict resolution, information 
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campaign, and values education.”218 The religious sector includes the various religious 
groups in the country, which are also considered vital to development and security because 
of their legitimacy, reach, and capacity to mobilize and facilitate support for peace and 
reconciliation.219  
Under the DSSP Kapayapaan campaign, the AFP’s mission is as follows:  
Conduct “development support operations” to sustain the peace, ensure 
security, and help maintain public order in order to foster the foundation for 
inclusive economic and human development of the Filipino people.220   
The published DSSP Kapayapaan document defines development support operations 
broadly as “AFP operations and activities conducted in support of civil authorities and 
other stakeholders.”221 It has placed emphasis on the AFP being in a support role as 
opposed to a leadership role in the development aspect; however, it remains the lead in 
terms of security.  
The campaign features four strategic concepts with a broad mandate for the AFP: 
“sustained military operations to defeat terrorist groups and deter armed peace spoilers; 
promotion of peace; active support to law enforcement; and contribution to nation-
building.”222 Under the plan, sustained military operations focus on the deliberate 
employment of forces and capabilities of the AFP to defeat all the armed groups in the 
country.223 In contributing to the promotion of peace, the AFP is to support and actively 
participate in the government’s peace negotiation efforts.224 Active support to law 
enforcement means that the AFP will also support the PNP and other law enforcement 
agencies in their campaign against illegal drugs and the dismantling of organized crime 
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groups and private armed groups.225 In contributing to nation building, the AFP is to 
perform tasks in collaboration with civil authorities to help address socio-economic 
issues.226 These activities include protection of the environment, climate change 
adaptation, and delivery of basic services.  
B. NEW AFP-LED INITIATIVES TO SUPPORT THE CAMPAIGN 
The DSSP Kapayapaan document published by the AFP states that the government 
and the AFP recognize that the effective delivery of basic services and governance to the 
communities is hampered by continued structural problems, despite the government’s 
efforts.227 Among these structural problems are the lack of a national body to integrate the 
efforts of the various national and local government agencies and the lack of government 
collaboration with civil society organizations that are also implementing CSPs in the 
barangays.  
With the recognition of these structural problems, the government and the AFP 
have instituted several initiatives that will help support the implementation of the 
campaign: first, the CSP, which is being implemented by the AFP as part of its 
counterinsurgency operations; second, an enhanced partnership with civil society; and 
third, the creation of a national task force that will help consolidate all the different national 
agencies’ and LGUs’ efforts against communist insurgency. 
1. Community Support Program  
The CSP is a “community- and issues-oriented operational concept employed in 
conflict areas” that was first implemented mid-2016 in the AFP’s Eastern Mindanao 
Command.228 It is a “multi-stakeholder, community-based, and people-oriented peace and 
development effort aimed to establish and develop disaster and conflict resilient 
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communities.”229 The CSP primer published by the Eastern Mindanao Command states 
that CSP places a premium on engagement with LGUs to identify, examine, and address 
primary issues being exploited by the CPP-NPA to fuel their ideological, political, and 
organizational efforts.230 The primer further states that community support is implemented 
by Community Support Teams (CSTs) organized at the battalion level (see Figure 9). A 
CST is composed of one infantry rifle squad (nine soldiers) that is trained to conduct 
community immersions, such as dialogue with barangay residents, livelihood trainings, 
and community support activities in collaboration with LGUs. Team leaders are selected 
based on their leadership capabilities and their ability to ensure that the CSP objectives in 
the communities are timely achieved.231 CSTs have their own respective cells, such as 
operations, intelligence, and CMO to ensure that each team can perform its tasks and 
individuals are supported in their specialty areas.  
 
Figure 9. Community Support Team (CST) Composition.232 
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The Doctrine and Capability Integration Center of the Training and Doctrine 
Command of the Philippine Army highlights some of the best practices for implementing 
CSP in eastern Mindanao, and it is expected that these lessons will effectively transfer to 
the rest of the CSP teams deployed in communist insurgent-affected communities.233 The 
Center states that CSP operations in the 4th and 10th Infantry Divisions have been 
successful because they have been able to peacefully engage the communities and work 
with locals from multiple sectors to identify the key issues in the community that need to 
be addressed.  
Although the Mindanao-based CSP operations have been successful, the 
Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG) identified that a lack of 
resources and low or nonexistent participation by national government agencies have 
limited the positive effects and sustainability of its operations.234 In October 2019, the 
DILG published Memorandum Circular No: 2019–169, Guidelines on the Implementation 
of the Retooled Community Support Program (RCSP), which aimed to strengthen the CSP 
initiatives of the AFP.235 RCSP, according to the memorandum, is an inclusive program 
aimed at addressing the governance and development gaps in the community by ensuring 
that local chief executives implement “programs, projects, and activities that are geared 
towards institutionalizing sustainable peace and development” in their respective 
localities.236 The memorandum further directs all LGUs to implement and support RCSP 
in their respective localities.  
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2. Enhanced Cooperation with Government Agencies and Civil Society  
In the previous AFP campaigns, particularly Oplan Lambat-Bitag (Net Trap) and 
Oplan Bantay-Laya (Guarding Freedom), there was little to no civil society involvement 
and government-agency cooperation in the implementation of the campaign. To eliminate 
public support for the communist insurgency, one of the key purposes of DSSP 
Kapayapaan is to harness nationalist sentiment and rally the support of civil society.237  
Since the implementation of the campaign, the AFP and its subordinate units have 
initiated and conducted various stakeholder-engagement activities, mainly with civil 
society, NGOs, and the religious sector but also with the various people’s organizations 
that are present in the communities. In her article, “The Security Reform Agenda for the 
AFP and PNP in 2018,” political scientist Jennifer Santiago Oreta noted a shift in the AFP 
and civil society organization (CSO) collaboration.238 She stated that, although avoided 
and distrusted at first, more and more CSOs are now involved and collaborating with the 
AFP. Oreta noted, in particular, the Bantay Bayanihan (BB) network, which started with 
seven organizations in 2010 and now has 250 member organizations representing various 
CSOs, religious, academe, and people’s organizations. BB started during the 
implementation of the AFP’s IPSP Bayanihan with a primary focus on having a “critical 
but constructive engagement with the AFP.”239  
Another important aspect of AFP collaboration with civil society that Oreta noted 
is the establishment of the Multi-Sectoral Governance Council (MSGC), whose primary 
purpose is to guide the AFP in its professionalization and modernization agenda.240 MSGC 
is composed of various respected stakeholders from different sectors of society. The 
General Headquarters, Major Services, Unified Commands, and other major units of the 
AFP now have their respective MSGC that helps them to professionalize and improve their 
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collaboration with the diverse sectors of society. They have worked on issues such as 
human rights violation, community engagements, and strategic communications with other 
stakeholders.  
3. National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict  
On December 4, 2018, as part of the nation’s counterinsurgency strategy, President 
Duterte signed Executive Order No. 70, s.2018 “institutionalizing the Whole of Nation 
approach in attaining inclusive and sustainable peace, creating a national task force to end 
local communist armed conflict and directing the adoption of a national peace 
framework.”241 Through this executive order, the National Task Force to End Local 
Communist Armed Conflict (NTF-ELCAC) was created to orchestrate and ensure that the 
whole-of-nation approach is effectively implemented. It is composed of representatives 
from various national government agencies, such as the DILG and Department of Social 
Welfare and Development (DSWD), and two representatives from the private sector who 
are appointed by the president for a one-year term.242 The President of the Philippines 
serves as Chairman while the National Security Adviser serves as Vice-Chairman.243 Such 
high-level involvement bodes well for government engagement. 
The NTF-ELCAC, as stated in Section 4 of the executive order, has the following 
powers and functions: 
a. Within six (6) months from the issuance of this 
Order, formulate and start to implement in coordination 
with relevant national government agencies, LGUs, the 
civil society and other stakeholders, a Whole-of-Nation 
approach-driven National Peace Framework; 
b. Ensure inter-agency convergence in the 
implementation of the Framework in conflict-affected and 
vulnerable communities; 
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c. Enlist the assistance of any department, bureau, 
office, agency or instrumentality of the government in 
accordance with their respective mandates; 
d. Evaluate, define, modify or integrate policies, 
programs and activities contained in the Framework; 
e. Organize ad hoc inter-agency and multi-sectoral 
clusters, councils, committees and groups in national, 
regional and local levels, or modify existing ones, 
whenever necessary to fulfill its mandates; 
f. Develop strategic communication, advocacy, and 
peace constituency plans in case of ceasefire, as well as 
capacity-building measures, to enable local chief 
executives and local peace bodies to engage and facilitate 
local peace engagements or negotiations and interventions; 
g. Review the mandates and functions of offices 
undertaking peace efforts to avoid duplication of function 
and programs, and submit its recommendation/s to the 
President for approval; 
h. As may be necessary, issue supplemental 
guidelines, protocols or policies in furtherance of this 
Order; 
i. Recommend to the Office of the Presidential 
Adviser on the Peace Process projects and conflict-
affected areas where the PAyapa at MAsaganand 
PamayaNAn (PAMANA) Program may be implemented, 
subject to the provisions of the General Appropriations 
Act; and 
j. Perform such other duties and functions as the 
President may direct.244 
The powers and functions of the task force highlight the government’s commitment in 
providing a national structure to ensure that collaboration and convergence of the different 
national government agencies, LGUs, AFP, and other stakeholders is achieved. It also 
emphasizes the whole-of-nation approach in resolving the communist insurgency.  
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Since its activation, the task force has been committed in its campaign against the 
communist insurgency. Journalist J.C. Gotinga found that AFP senior military officers 
believe that NTF-ELCAC is the government’s response to the “socio-politico-economic 
dimension of the counterinsurgency campaign.”245 Gotinga explained that the NTF-
ELCAC is intended to integrate the government’s efforts to address the varied strategies 
being used by the communist insurgents. Journalist Marita Moaje reported that NTF-
ELCAC has received positive feedback from the Senate Committee on National Defense 
and Security, Peace, Unification and Reconciliation.246 Quoting from the committee’s 
report, she argued that “the whole-of-nation approach by NTF-ELCAC could be the most 
effective anti-insurgency program as evidenced by the continuous and consistent reduction 
of the influence and strength of the CPP-NPA.”247 The activation of NTF-ELCAC was a 
welcome development for the AFP, since an organization could now lead the coordination 
of governance, security, and development initiatives in the community. 
C. CAMPAIGN COMPARISON 
DSSP Kapayapaan builds on the gains that were made in the previous AFP 
campaigns, particularly IPSP Bayanihan. It recognizes the need for the AFP to conduct 
development, governance, and security operations that support civil authorities in their 
initiatives in the communities. This section outlines how DSSP Kapayapaan attempts to 
address the three shortcomings of the three campaigns discussed in Chapter IV, namely 
inadequate sustainment capability, lack of support from government and civil society, and 
challenges of political leadership.  
1. Addressing Inadequate Sustainment Capability 
Because of a lack of personnel and equipment in the previous campaigns, 
inadequate sustainment has been one of the AFP’s key challenges to achieving its 
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counterinsurgency objectives. The Duterte administration has made several attempts to 
increase the strength and improve the capabilities of the AFP. In August 2017, Duterte 
asked Philippine lawmakers to approve the recruitment of an additional 20,000 soldiers to 
address the security threats within the country.248 In 2018, the AFP activated the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines Special Operations Command (AFPSOCOM), which took control 
of all the special operations units of the Philippine Army, Air Force, and Navy.249 Later 
that year, the Philippine Army activated the 11th Infantry Division to address the terrorism 
threats in the southern part of the country.250 This activation meant that the AFP was no 
longer required to shift its forces from Luzon to address the threats in the south. In 2019, 
Duterte ordered the recruitment of an additional 25,000 soldiers who will be tasked to 
address the communist insurgency and terrorism.251 As of 2020, the AFP was estimated 
to have 151,400 active duty personnel and about 62,300 paramilitary forces.252  
In terms of capability development, the AFP has continued to pursue its 
modernization program to augment its existing capabilities. The 2019 Department of 
National Defense (DND) report revealed that a total of PhP 16.8 billion (US$336 million) 
was allocated for capability, material, and technology development projects in the AFP.253 
Most of this equipment was intended to bolster the AFP’s internal security operations 
capabilities. Equipment was paired with dedicated time for training and maintenance to 
bolster impact and sustainability. 
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2. Lack of Support from Government Institutions  
Unlike predecessor campaigns that lacked sustained support from government 
institutions, DSSP Kapayapaan has enjoyed full, ongoing backing from the administration. 
Duterte signed Executive Order (EO) No. 70 in 2018 to institutionalize a whole-of-nation 
approach within the government’s counterinsurgency strategy. A key effect of this 
executive order is that national government agencies and LGUs are actively collaborating 
to support the AFP in its campaign. A senior AFP official has acknowledged that “good 
governance practices and efficient delivery of basic services for their constituents create 
resilient communities that thwart the return of the communist terrorist groups,”254 which 
is the dynamic that the executive order aimed to facilitate. The AFP official further added 
that with such developments, the AFP could now focus on those who continued to persist 
with armed struggle.  
Although there were similar attempts made in previous administrations, like the 
Ramos administration’s National Reunification Policy and Arroyo’s Strategy of Holistic 
Approach, they ultimately fell short without a comprehensive, government-wide plan to 
support the campaign.255 Unlike the previous campaigns in which the AFP was the 
frontline in the government’s counterinsurgency strategy, EO 70 puts the local 
governments in the frontlines.256  Reporter Marit Cabugon has observed that “EO 70 
strikes a balance between the two extremes: concessions—through peace talks and 
ceasefire—to the Communist Party of the Philippines, and a purely military option.”257 
Cabugon has also reported that lack of support from civilian government was a primary 
source of major frustration for the military in insurgency-infested areas. Unlike previous 
administrations, which designated a Cabinet Secretary, EO Nr. 70 places the President as 
the Chairman of the National Task Force, which represents the full commitment of the 
administration to the counterinsurgency strategy.  
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3. Challenges to Political Leadership 
Unlike previous administrations, Duterte’s has not experienced political instability 
and challenge from a strong, well-organized opposition. The president’s popularity with 
the general public has remained high.258 However, like the previous administrations, the 
Duterte administration has been challenged by corruption, criminality and drugs, 
insurgency, and terrorism. Duterte was catapulted into the presidency based on campaign 
promises to overcome these issues. Despite the administration’s effort to curb corruption 
in the country, the Philippines was ranked 115 out of 180 countries by Transparency 
International in 2020, which was nearly identical to the country’s ranking when the Duterte 
administration began in 2016.259  
Like his predecessors, Duterte put peace negotiations with insurgents at the top of 
his agenda. His administration entered into peace negotiations with the CPP-NPA and the 
Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), with the latter in the final stages of cementing a 
plan for implementation of a peace agreement.260 To demonstrate his sincerity, Duterte 
offered four cabinet positions to the leftist organization and guaranteed the safety of CPP 
founder Jose Maria Sison and Luis Jalandoni if they choose to return to the Philippines.261 
He also approved the conditional release of communist leaders who would be part of the 
CPP’s negotiating team. The initial peace stance of the government, however, changed 
when the NPA persistently launched attacks against unwary police and military personnel 
in the countryside.262 After these attacks, Duterte withdrew these offers. 
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Another significant difference between the Duterte administration and its 
predecessors has been the perceived “militarization” of his government. In a special report 
for the Sunstar Manila, investigative reporter Ruth Gita revealed that as of 2019 Duterte 
had appointed 46 former military and police officers to key positions in the government, 
including ten Cabinet-level positions.263 She reported that Duterte’s reasoning behind 
these appointments was his dissatisfaction with the sluggish work of some of the civilians 
in the government agencies. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Although the initial results of DSSP Kapayapaan have been promising, it remains 
to be seen whether this campaign will achieve its objective of defeating the communist 
insurgents by the end of Duterte’s term in 2022, or even if its six-year timeline is 
reasonable. The new initiatives that the Philippine government and the AFP are 
implementing seem to address sizable gaps and shortcomings of the previous campaigns. 
The creation of the NTF-ELCAC has so far been successful in ensuring that the AFP has 
been receiving the necessary collaboration and convergence that it needs with the national 
government agencies, LGUs, and civil society. The CSP operations being conducted by the 
AFP have also been effective in identifying community issues that need to be resolved. 
Finally, although the Duterte administration faces the same socio-economic problems as 
those of his predecessors, it has not yet had to contend with political instability, which 
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VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
After more than five decades, the Philippines is still fighting a domestic communist 
insurgency. To this date, the CPP-NPA remains the primary threat confronting the AFP.264 
Although the AFP data show that the CPP-NPA military capabilities have been 
significantly reduced since their peak in the mid- to late 1980s, it is insufficient to rely on 
these statistics alone to measure the government’s counterinsurgency success. This chapter 
summarizes the reasons why the CPP-NPA re-emerged in the 1960s and offers three 
primary explanations for why the CPP-NPA has not yet been defeated, despite the  
end of the Cold War in the early 1990s and continual efforts by the AFP. This chapter also 
provides recommendations to address the major factors that have hindered the AFP 
campaigns in defeating the communist insurgents and makes recommendations for  
future studies. 
A. MAJOR FINDINGS 
The Philippine government has implemented four primary counterinsurgency 
strategies since the Marcos dictatorship was defeated in 1986 and democracy reinstated: 
the National Reunification Policy implemented during the President Corazon Aquino and 
President Ramos administrations (1988–92 and 1992–98, respectively); Strategy of 
Holistic Approach implemented by the President Arroyo administration (2001–2010); the 
people-centered security strategy during the President Benigno Aquino administration 
(2010–2016); and the whole-of-nation approach currently being implemented by the 
Duterte administration (2016–present).265 In each, the AFP, in particular, has played a 
central role, not just in combat operations but in governance itself. 
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1. Reasons for the Communist Insurgency’s Re-emergence and 
Sustainment 
The reasons for the communists’ re-emergence are closely linked to the reasons 
why the insurgency has continued for the past five decades. From its humble beginnings in 
Capas, Tarlac, in 1969, the CPP-NPA gradually evolved to become a potent threat to the 
Philippine government for three primary reasons.266 First, the presence of severe political 
and economic inequality within the country provided widespread grievances for the CPP-
NPA to exploit. In particular, the government’s inefficiency, corruption, and inability to 
deliver basic services to the people, particularly to those in the countryside, have provided 
the communist insurgents with narratives to use against a state that is expected to foster 
democratic ideals, justice, and opportunity.267  
Second, the CPP-NPA identified and committed to the Protracted People’s War 
(PPW) strategy. Since its beginning, the CPP-NPA divided its struggle into three major 
stages: strategic defensive, strategic stalemate, and strategic offensive.268  Although the 
CPP-NPA did not seem to move past the strategic defensive stage, PPW remains an 
effective strategy for prolonging the conflict against the Philippine government.  
Third, the CPP-NPA has effectively exploited social and political conditions in the 
country. The group has demonstrated its capability to mobilize the masses through agitation 
and propaganda activities, as well as local politics and regular leadership changes in 
government and the military. Deeply rooted inequities in land ownership, labor rights, and 
access to political and social power worsened during the Marcos era and remain 
unresolved.  
2. Why the CPP-NPA Has Not Yet Been Defeated 
By examining four major AFP campaigns—Oplan Lambat-Bitag (Net Trap) from 
1989 to 1998, Oplan Bantay-Laya (Guarding Freedom) from 2001 to 2010, IPSP 
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Bayanihan (Civic Unity) from 2011 to 2016, and DSSP Kapayapaan (Peace) from 2016 to 
the present—this research has identified inadequate sustainment capability, lack of support 
from government institutions, and challenges to political leadership as the primary factors 
that hindered the AFP campaigns from achieving their overriding objective of defeating 
the CPP-NPA.  
Inadequate sustainment capability, particularly in terms of equipment and 
personnel, was the primary reason cited by AFP senior commanders in a report published 
by the International Crisis Group in 2011.269 The inability to provide adequate forces to 
sustain the operational gains in the barangays was a main weakness of Oplan Lambat-
Bitag.270 The AFP encountered the same problem of inadequate sustainment capability 
during the implementation of its Oplan Bantay-Laya and IPSP Bayanihan, again leading 
to the AFP’s inability to capitalize on the gains made in cleared areas.  
Lack of crucial support from government institutions has also significantly 
hindered the implementation of the AFP campaigns. This research identified three factors 
contributing to this lack of support: first, a lack of understanding and appreciation among 
various government institutions for the AFP’s counterinsurgency efforts. This led to 
persistent shortcomings of these agencies to deliver the necessary development activities 
in areas cleared by the AFP.271 Second, government officials lacked a common 
understanding of the communist insurgency. Despite adjustments made over the years by 
the government to implement a whole-of-government counterinsurgency strategy, the 
insurgency was, and perhaps still is, viewed by many officials as a problem solely for the 
military to solve. Further, although the Philippine government and even the AFP have 
received significant support from its allies and security partners, this support has not been 
focused on defeating communist insurgents but instead on counterterrorism, maritime 
security, and developing the defense industry.  
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Finally, centralized challenges to political leadership have hindered the 
implementation of the campaigns and whole-of-government response. All four 
administrations were hindered in fully implementing their respective counterinsurgency 
strategy because of fragmented government structure and corrupt leaders. In addition, 
ongoing and widespread political instability from other sources regularly threatened the 
central government, thus distracting from the implementation of the counterinsurgency 
strategy. For instance, Presidents Corazon Aquino and Arroyo both faced several coup 
attempts that shifted the AFP’s focus and bred distrust between civilian and military 
leaders. President Benigno Aquino also faced several destabilizing events—the Manila 
hostage crisis, Scarborough Shoal incident, and Mamasapano clash—that weakened his 
political legitimacy and power.272 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
Having identified the three main factors that hindered the implementation of the 
AFP’s campaign, this section provides the author’s recommendation on how these factors 
can be addressed. 
1. Addressing the Inadequate Sustainment Capability 
The Philippine government has found ways to address the AFP’s lack of resources 
in terms of material, personnel, and equipment but has yet to be able to sustain these gains. 
The recent recruitment of additional personnel, procurement of equipment, and activation 
of additional units of the AFP are welcome developments. While it can be argued that the 
AFP still lacks the number of personnel and the equipment needed to address the threats, 
the current AFP deployment of forces has proven to be effective in significantly reducing 
the CPP-NPA military capabilities.  
Yet, this is only a first step. The AFP also needs to focus on establishing a conflict-
resilient community that ensures previously cleared areas remain free from insurgent 
threats. Conflict-resilient communities can be established at the barangay level and 
initiated by Community Support Teams deployed in the area. The CSTs, however, cannot 
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do this alone and should partner with LGUs, the PNP, civil society, faith-based groups, and 
the community. To be effective, the AFP should first ensure that conflict-affected 
communities understand that soldiers will have to transfer out and eventually move to clear 
other areas. The local PNP should be capable of securing the community. LGUs, 
particularly their leaders, and civil society should be fully integrated into supporting the 
various peace and security initiatives in the barangay. 
Second, is the establishment of an Integrated Territorial Defense System (ITDS). 
The ITDS is designed to secure previously cleared areas from communist insurgents’ re-
entry by providing ongoing security.273 The ITDS concept was previously implemented 
during Oplan Bantay-Laya. At that time, however, ITDS was mostly composed of 
paramilitary forces and did not have adequate support from the LGU, civil society, and the 
community.  
A best practice being implemented in the EASTMINCOM area that can be 
implemented in other Area Commands is organizing former rebels and former supporters 
of CPP-NPA in the barangays as a people’s organization. These groups are organized by 
the CSTs deployed in the barangays and awarded livelihood programs by LGUs and 
national government agencies. This action has proven to be effective, because it has made 
the communist insurgents’ recovery efforts in the area difficult, given that there are fewer 
community grievances to exploit. The existence of people’s organizations also serves to 
counter the insurgent’s propaganda in the barangays. Aside from depriving the CPP-NPA 
of manpower resources, these people’s organizations can also be utilized to form part of 
the ITDS. As such, the livelihood programs provided by the government become part of 
the sustainment effort of the AFP against communist insurgents in the barangays.  
Third, the AFP needs to enhance its intelligence operation. The success of CSP is 
heavily reliant on information provided by the intelligence community, which is highly 
reliant on community participation. All the campaigns have focused on improving the 
intelligence system of the AFP, resulting in a decline in CPP-NPA military capabilities. 
Yet, the intelligence operations should also focus on identifying supporters and 
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underground mass organizations established by the CPP-NPA. These underground groups 
provide structure that supports the insurgents, politically and economically, in the 
community. To bolster sustainability, the intelligence community should be able to 
capitalize on the gains made by CSTs in conflict-affected communities. 
2. Addressing Lack of Government Institution Support and Lack of 
Civil Society Support 
It is very important for political and military leaders to understand the urgency of 
destroying the communist insurgents’ infrastructures. Paul Melshen, a professor of 
Strategic Studies and Military History at the National Defense University, argues that 
“without the elimination of both the political and economic infrastructure, it is almost 
impossible to defeat insurgents.”274 Yet, without the support of government institutions 
and civil society, it would be very difficult for the AFP to do this alone.  
Three programs being implemented by the current administration offer promise in 
this area: first is the implementation of the Community Support Program, being 
implemented by the CSTs in conflict-affected areas, which places the program in an 
important role that can serve as a link between the community and government institutions. 
This access should help ensure that the grievances and concerns of the community are 
addressed by the right government agencies and should help minimize community issues 
that the CPP-NPA can exploit.  
Second, the establishment of the Multi-Sectoral Governance Council, or MSGC, 
should help the AFP in its professionalization and modernization agenda.275 Significantly, 
the MSGC provides a venue for civil society to engage the AFP in various areas, such as 
human rights and disaster relief, not solely in the implementation of the military campaign. 
Third, the National Task Force to End Local Communist Armed Conflict, or NTF-ELCAC, 
a specific government entity, should help ensure more effective implementation of the 
government’s whole-of-nation counterinsurgency strategy.  
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3. Addressing Challenges with Political and Military Leadership 
An effective counterinsurgency strategy should start with a clear political policy, 
grounded in a shared understanding of the root causes of the conflict and long-term 
commitment to tackling those root causes. Paul Melshen has argued that a strategy should 
evolve from political policy and not the other way around.276 Strong political leadership 
is necessary to ensure that any counterinsurgency strategy is implemented and supported 
in earnest. It is thus very important for the AFP to ensure that political leaders are properly 
apprised and advised of the root causes, conditions, needs, resources, and strategy, just as 
it is important for the AFP to be properly apprised of government priorities and challenges.  
In addition to clear communication and plans, political leaders must demonstrate a 
strong political commitment to defeating the communist insurgents. The creation of the 
NTF-ELCAC demonstrated the determination of the Duterte administration to end the 
communist insurgency through a whole-of-nation approach. The AFP, for its part, should 
ensure that it is able to capitalize on the political support that it is receiving and ensure that 
this support remains true down to the local level. Even as leaders face other or unexpected 
challenges, they must publicly reiterate their ongoing commitment to the 
counterinsurgency plans. 
Furthermore, political and military leaders should both realize that effective 
counterinsurgency requires involvement of a high number of personnel and greater 
cooperation among the different government agencies and the community. Some political 
leaders believe that insurgency is solely a problem for the military to solve. This mindset 
must change, especially since it has contributed to the lack of cooperation between the AFP 
and political leaders on the ground.  
C. FUTURE STUDIES 
Although the Philippine government has demonstrated its capability to defeat 
communist insurgents, as in its defeat of the Huks in the mid-1950s, it remains to be seen 
whether the government can succeed in resolving the five-decade-long communist 
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insurgency in the country. The current DSSP Kapayapaan campaign has made significant 
strides toward this goal. Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the current administration will 
achieve its objectives by the end of President Duterte’s term in 2022 and, if not, whether 
the strides already made can be sustained.  
Future studies could expand on the specific stumbling blocks that the AFP needs to 
address, such as inadequate sustainment capabilities in confronting the multiple security 
threats surrounding the country. Future studies could also explore the vital role of civil 
society in helping the counterinsurgency campaigns of the AFP and government. The 
current strides that the AFP has made in engaging and involving civil society in crafting 
and implementing its campaign represent a significant shift from a purely militaristic 
mindset to solve insurgency. Future studies could also explore the DSSP Kapayapaan in 
more depth after it has had more time to operate. This study has examined the early efforts 
made in the implementation of the campaign to address the identified gaps in the previous 
campaigns. It is important to understand whether, and to what degree, these changes have 
resulted in significant gains that could benefit the AFP and the Philippine government’s 
counterinsurgency strategy. Such future studies could also help us understand why certain 
changes were successful and whether the counterinsurgency strategy helped address the 
roots causes of the conflict. 
The security and development approach being implemented today has been a 
proven formula. It worked in favor of the Philippine government when it defeated the Huks 
in the mid-1950s. Nevertheless, it is important to note that these earlier counterinsurgency 
successes were also enabled by both the people’s support and strong political and military 
leadership. Any current or future strategy, based on time-tested methods, will still require 
these qualities to defeat any insurgency. The current whole-of-nation approach has the 
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